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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Cote d’Ivoire, hitherto regarded as the most stable country in a very unstable region was plunged into 
civil war in 2002, following confrontations between mutineers from the north of the country and forces 
loyal to president Laurent Gbagbo.This has led to a division of the country into north and south. The 
self-serving pursuit of money and power is one side of a dual dynamic in this conflict; on the other 
side, stands a profound disagreement about who is, or who should be considered an Ivorian citizen. 
Thus, Zolberg notes that politicians in Cote d’Ivoire in search of legitimacy fabricated the issue of who 
is an Ivorian: an ideology and propaganda directed by those in power, created in the social imagination 
to exclude their rivals from political office. In light of this, the issue of “us versus them” has become a 
perennial social gathering to access wealth and power. The politicization of identity to gain or 
maintain power has become a kind of social cannon that could only be extended to northerners and 
foreigners1.  
 
The “Ivorian miracle”-a phrase widely used in the 1960s and 1970s to describe the country’s 
impressive economic record and apparent success as a model developer- was based on equal parts of 
foreign capital, available labour from neighbouring countries and Ivorian, land and labour policies. 
Following the economic downturn in the 1980s, the fight for diminishing resources has become 
increasingly bitter and anti-foreign rhetoric among those who see themselves as “pure” or “true” 
Ivorians has gained momentum. The politics of identity in the country today represent the product of a 
complex interaction between deep-seated resentments and transparent attempts to manipulate anti-
foreign rhetoric for political ends. For instance, conscious of the legal complexities of indegeneity in a 
territorial entity whose political boundaries had shifted and that was home to millions of immigrants, 
Ivorians of southern became more sophisticated in their legal arguments. They excluded Alassane 
 
1 Aristide R Zolberg, “Political development in Ivory Coast since independence”, in Philip Forster and Aristide Zolberg 
(eds), Ghana and the Ivory Coast: Perspectives on Modernisation, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971. p.18 
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Ouattara from the presidential race not because he was not a citizen or had dual nationality, but on the 
grounds that he had in the past “availed himself of another nationality” by carrying a diplomatic 
passport from Burkina Faso.2
 
Given this background, President Thabo Mbeki was designated by the African Union (AU) and the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to mediate a peace process in Cote 
d’Ivoire. Such decision seemed logical since South Africa chairs the Peace and Security Council of the 
AU. Besides, there is reason to believe that the involvement of a credible third party from outside 
West Africa might actually be the key to unlock the problem in that country. 
Mbeki’s involvement came against the backdrop of various failed attempts at brokering a peace deal 
by othet third parties-France, ECOWAS etc. 
 
1. Significance of study 
This study seeks to investigate the rationale behind the designation of South Africa by the AU, as a 
peacemaker in Cote d’Ivoire. Of major concern here is to attempt to understand reasons why the AU 
thought South Africa possessed the capacity to broker peace in Cote d’Ivoire where France and 
ECOWAS had failed.  
 
Could it be that, South Africa’s history gave it a moral authority in Africa that many Western countries 
cannot claim? From Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), through Darfur and now 
to Cote d’Ivoire, President Mbeki has drawn on his standing to try to spread peace across the 
continent, demonstrating to the world that Africa can be relied upon to solve its own problems. Since 
his appointment as mediator, Mbeki has been trying to get the Marcoussis Peace Accords and the 
Acrra II & III processes back on track.Yet, inspite of the Pretoria meeting held in April 2005 which led 
to the disarmament agreement between Gbagbo and the New Forces (Force Nouvellle), the road map 
 
2 Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja, “Citizenship, political violence, and democratization in Africa”, Global Governance, 10, 
2004. p.403 
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has lagged behind as disarmament of rebel groups was expected to be at an advanced group stage in 
June of the same year. 
 
2. Research Questions 
Within the context of this research, the following questions will be addressed: 
1) Why did the African Union designate South Africa as mediator in the Ivorian peace process? 
2) What difference can South Africa make in Cote d’Ivoire’s search for peace, given the failure of 
other third parties? 
3) Why was South Africa mandated to broker a peace deal in Cote d’Ivoire only in November 2004, as 
opposed to four years ago when the conflict was in its early stages? 
4) Can South Africa really export its model of peace-making, namely, power-sharing in politically and 
socially divided societies such as Cote d’Ivoire? 
 
3. Aim and Rationale 
The literature surrounding the root causes of conflict in post independence Francophone countries have 
laid a lot of emphasis on ethnicity, minority right, religion and corruption as central factors. Whilst this 
may be true, little attention has been paid to the absence of distributive mechanisms/institutions and 
the absence of good governance as factors that spark off conflict in the continent.  
 
There is an absence of an early warning system or the refusal by regional and international actors to 
heed to early warnings in potential conflict zones. The general trend in West Africa as in other regions 
of the continent is to look for outside intervention after conflicts have erupted and already caused great 
damage to society. This has been the case in the Cote d’Ivoire, which was once regarded as the oasis of 
peace in a troubled region. 
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Like the intervention of the British in Sierra Leone and the United States in Liberia, France as the 
former colonial power in cote d’Ivoire has been very much involved in the process of resolving the 
conflictin Cote d’Ivoire. The French position has been the least ambivalent, as they have been accused 
by the government of Cote d’Ivoire as well as the rebels of taking sides in the conflict. This has 
therefore sparked anti French sentiments in the country and led to the expulsion of thousands of 
French citizens. France no longer posseses the legitimacy as a neutral mediator. It was against this 
background that the AU and ECOWAS mandated South Africa to continue with the process of 
resolving the crisis.  
 
This project therefore seeks to investigate why South Africa was given the responsibility of bringing 
peace to the country and to highlight the progress that has been made so far in the resolving the 
conflict. 
 
4. Organization of work 
This paper is divided into seven chapters. Chapter one provides introduction and significance of the 
study. Chapter two provides a historical background to the post-colonial state of Cote d’Ivoire. In 
doing so, we outline fundamental issues surrounding the personality of Houphouet Boingy whose 
presidency and policies have influenced the present crisis in Cote d’Ivoire. This chapter also provides 
a brief background of the political explanations and reasons why the AU chose South Africa to 
intervene and establish peace-building mechanisms in Cote d’Ivoire. Chapter three highlights the 
causes and origins of armed conflict in Cote d’Ivoire. Although conflict is an international 
phenomenon but Africa remains the most conflict ridden continent in the world, with most of them are 
intrastate rather than interstate. The widespread nature of poor economic policies throughout Africa is 
seen as the main source of conflict and begets animosity between various groups leading to civil wars. 
This chapter therefore brings to light the politics of inclusion versus politics of exclusion and the 
relative deprivation theory with a particular focus on Cote d’Ivoire. Chapter four examines the failure 
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of the implementation of the French brokered Linas Marcoussis Peace Accords, the little success 
achieved by the Accra Accords in addressing the conflict, and how the Pretoria Accords compliments 
these accords. Chapter five examines the efforts of South Africa in bringing peace to other regions of 
the continent particularly in the Great Lakes. This chapter also highlights the reasons the AU and 
ECOWAS bestowed on South Africa the task of bringing once more the belligerents to the negotiating 
table. It interrogates why member states thought it was wise to involve South Africa in the peace 
process at this point in the conflict and not fours years ago when the conflict was in its early stages. 
Chapter six examines South Africa’s strategic interests in its attempt to broker a peace deal in Cote 
d’Ivoire as well as conditions constraining South Africa to successfully pursue its interests in the 
Ivorian conflict. Finally, Chapter seven concludes the study by setting out lessons for South Africa in 
its future intervention, in West Africa in particular, and Africa generally. 
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Chapter 2:  Houphouet Boigny and the present Ivrorian conflict 
 
1. Felix Houphouet Boigny’s era 
 Felix Houphouet Boigny dominated political life in Cote d’Ivoire since independence from the French 
rule in August 1960 until his death in 1993. Until 1990, he was the sole candidate for the presidency at 
every election and his Parti Démocratique de la Côte d’Ivoire – Rassemblement Démocratique 
Africain (PDCI-RDA), was the only legal political party until that same year. During his thirty-three 
years as president, Boigny guided the economic and political life of the country without any effective 
challenge to his rule. Sporadic political unrest was usually without cohesion and political patronage 
was used to diffuse political unrest.3 At the heart of the Ivorian model was the plantation economy. 
Under president Boigny, the agricultural sector grew rapidly, partnerships with foreign companies 
brought an influx of capital into the agricultural sector as well as privileged access to European 
markets and agreements on cocoa and coffee which guaranteed planters with high prices for their 
exports.4
 
Economically, the president’s policy of encouraging mass immigration of plantation workers from 
Burkina Faso, Liberia, Guinea and Mali provided planters with a steady labour supply, supported by 
Boigny’s famous dictum of “land belongs to those that cultivate it”. This justified the massive 
acquisition of land by populations foreign to the rich cocoa and coffee belt whether they were Ivorians 
or foreigners from neighbouring states. This remarkable economic success compelled outside 
observers to refer to the “Ivorian miracle” as the country remained the world’s leader in cocoa 
production accounting for some 40% of global output.5 It was also the world’s third largest coffee 
 
3 Regional Surveys of the World: Africa South of the Sahara (34th ed), London: Europa Publications, 2005. p.341 
4 International Crisis Group (ICG), “Cote d’Ivoire: the war is not over yet”, ICG Africa Report, 2003. p.68 
5 “Bertelsmann Transformation Index - Country Reports: Cote d’Ivoire”, 2005. Homepage of Bertelsmann Stiftung. 
Accessed on 18 Feb. 2006. <http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/88.0,html?L=1> 
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producer and a significant exporter of bananas, making Cote d’Ivoire the economic powerhouse of 
West Africa. 
 
The grievances of the country’s many ethnic groups were concealed by dividing government 
appointments among them. Boigny was able to neutralize xenophobia even in the midst of the influx 
of thousands of foreign plantation workers. Although his enthusiasm for the immigration of these 
foreigners stimulated resistance from indigenous population notably the Bete, and Kroumen in the 
South West, Boigny appeased these groups by offering them positions in the administration, the 
private sector and the army.6
 
The economic recession of the 1980s and the liberalization of global markets brought a dramatic drop 
in primary product prices and the country was plunged into a financial crisis that was worsened by 
government corruption and mismanagement. Faced with the state’s inability to absorb increasing 
numbers of educated youth, rising demands for social services by the middle class and calls for wage 
increase from the civil service, the army as well as the educational sector, the government was forced 
to break its compact with planters.Therefore, the economic crisis of the 1980’s precipitated the 
collapse of the political monopoly of the PDCI in state institutions. With these economic constraints, 
the state was faced with making more dramatic cutbacks in the housing and agricultural sector than 
had been the case before. This created a social atmosphere in which associations that had traditionally 
abided by the quasi-corporatist system started to contest the limited range of action that the regime 
permitted.7 In 1990, prices paid to planters were cut in half resulting immediately in mass protests. 
Unemployed youth from the cities went to the rural areas to look for jobs only to discover that much of 
 
6 “History of Cote d’Ivoire (Ivory Coast)”, nd. Homepage of Nguni Imports. Accessed on 1 Sep. 2005. 
<http://www.nguni.com/culture/virtualafrica/cotedivoire/history.html> 
7 Dwayne Woods, “Cote d’Ivoire: the crisis of distributive politics”, in L.A. Villalion and P.A. Huxtabvle (eds), The 
African State at A Critical Juncture, Between Disintegration and Reconfiguration, London: Lynne Rienner, 1985. p.225 
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the land they intended to cultivate was under the control of foreigners. With no work and no land, 
xenophobia grew.8
 
Soon, Cote d’Ivoire began to experience unprecedented levels of political upheaval. Demonstrations 
involving students and workers centered on the government’s austerity policies which had been 
introduced to comply with preconditions for assistance by international creditors. Persistent anti-
government unrest led to the deployment of troops in Abidjan, and in April 1991 following the death 
of a student when troops intervened to disperse demonstrations, all educational establishments were 
closed. Houphouet Boigny’s response to the crisis was uncharacteristically repressive, as the police 
and the gendarmerie were deployed to contain the strikes. 
 
 These upheavals were partly attributed to the distributional politics that placed a heavy burden on the 
fiscal solvency of the state. During the last quarter of the 1980s, such strategies of political 
consolidation became increasingly untenable. The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) had indicated that public expenditures and foreign borrowings were out of control in Cote 
d’Ivoire and that if appropriate measures were not taken seriously the country would be solvent. As a 
result, the IMF suggested the adoption and implementation of an austerity budget in the early years of 
the 1990s. This austerity budget translated into suppression of free education, cuts in housing subsidy 
and a general reduction in salaries. Hence, the paternalistic mode of governance that Boigny relied on 
to maintain a firm grip on the country had become too expensive and had to be discontinued in light of 
the country’s shrinking economic resources9. 
 
 
8 “History of Cote d’Ivoire (Ivory Coast)”, nd. Homepage of Nguni Imports. Accessed on 1 Sep. 2005. 
<http://www.nguni.com/culture/virtualafrica/cotedivoire/history.html> 
9 Dwayne Woods, “Cote d’Ivoire: the crisis of distributive politics”, in L.A. Villalion and P.A. Huxtabvle (eds), The 
African State at A Critical Juncture, Between Disintegration and Reconfiguration, London: Lynne Rienner, 1985. p.225 
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Feeling that things were getting out of hand, Boigny introduced multi-party politics.10 Opposition 
groups that had previously operated unofficially now acquired legal status and a good number of 
political parties were formed. Cote d’Ivoire’s first contested presidential elections were conducted on 
October 28 1990, with Houphouet Boigny challenged by Laurent Gbagbo, the candidate for the Front 
Populaire Ivoirien (FPI). The incumbent was elected to a seventh term of office by a large majority of 
votes. In November of the same year, the National Assembly approved two constitutional 
amendments. The first effectively strengthened the position of Henri Konan Bedie, who was head of 
the National Asembly, through the provision for the president of the National Assembly to assume the 
functions of the president of the Republic, should this office become vacant, until the expiry of the 
mandate of the incumbent. The second made provisions for the appointment of a Prime Minister, a 
post subsequently awarded to Allasane Dramane Ouattara.11
 
Houphouet Boingy left the country in May 1993 and subsequently spent six months receiving 
treatment in France and Switzerland. As the president’s health failed, controversy was revived about 
the question of a likely successor. Allasane Ouattara and Laurent Gbagbo, both of whom had nursed 
presidential ambitions, were among the prominent politicians who denounced the process defined in 
the constitution, alleging that it effectively endorsed an “hereditary” presidency because Bedie, like 
Houphouet Boigny, was a member of the Baoule ethnic group. The president died on December 7 
1993 and on that same day, Bedie announced his assumption of the presidency in accordance with the 
constitution. Ouattara resigned as Prime Minister two days after France acknowledged Bedie’s 
legitimacy as president. 
 
2. Henry Konan Bedie’s Presidency 
Bedie was elected chairman of the PDCI-RDA in 1994. Considerable controversy was caused by the 
adoption, in December 1994, of a new electoral code in preparation for the 1995 presidential and 
 
10 “The Change of regime in the Ivory Coast, Houphouet Boigny’s era”, nd. Homepage of Business Africa TM. Accessed on 
1 Feb. 2006. <http://businessafrica.net/africabiz/ezine/wa/newswaf2.php> 
11 Regional Surveys of the World: Africa South of the Sahara (34th ed), London: Europa Publications, 2005. p.356 
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legislative elections. Still concerned about a potential challenge from Ouattara as a candidate for the 
newly created Rassemblement des Républicains (RDR) in the upcoming elections, and looking to 
appeal to nationalist elements in a population increasingly angry over the economic crisis, Bedie 
announced the policy of “Ivoirité” (Ivorianess), which had to do with issues of national identity.12 
This included the promulgation of a new electoral code thus essentially creating two types of citizens; 
those of “true or pure” Ivorian origin, and those of mixed heritage. This was aimed at Alassane 
Ouattara, who had become leader of the main opposition party, the RDR, and whose father, it was 
alleged, was from Burkina Faso. Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja argues that incumbents bent on prolonging 
their stay in power have used exclusionary notions of citizenship to bar their most challenging rivals 
from the electoral process. The best-known examples of this practice are the disqualification of former 
president of Zambia Kenneth Kaunda and former prime minister of Cote d’Ivoire Alassane Dramane 
Ouattara from presidential elections repectively in 1996 and 2002. Because one was a founding father 
and the other had served as head of government under the venerable Felix Houphouet Boigny, the 
incumbent regimes felt compelled to resort to constituional gymnastics to justify their political 
exclusion on the basis of citizenship13. In this regard, a good number of northerners equally lost their 
positions in government. Thus, went away Boigny’s vision of an “Ivorian melting pot” 
 
The elections took place as scheduled in October 1995 following a week of violence in several towns, 
and Bedie won with 95.2% of the votes cast after a boycott by most political parties. After five years 
under Bedie, Cote d’Ivoire appeared to be slipping inexorably towards violent authoritarianism and 
economic ruin. In November 1996, the government announced the suspension and the dismissal of 
several members of the armed forces after investigations by a military commission into what was 
confirmed as a destabilization plot. In January 1997, General Robert Guei, chief of the armed forces 
was dismissed. A government communiqué stated that the investigative commission had found that he 
 
12 Daphnée Dion-Viens, “Cote d’Ivoire a Who’s Who”, 2 Nov. 2002.  Homepage of Alternatives. Accessed on 14 Nov. 
2005. <http://www.alternatives.ca/article107.html> 
13 Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja, “Citizenship, political violence, and democratization in Africa”, Global Governance, 10, 
2004. p.403 
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had committed “serious disciplinary offences in the discharge of his duties14”. In August 1999, 
Ouattara who had returned to Cote d’Ivoire in July and had obtained a certificate confirming his 
Ivorian identity was confirmed as the RDR’s presidential candidate. Thereafter, the long simmering 
confrontation between Bedie and Ouattara continued, as Bedie continued to insist that he regarded his 
rival as a Burkinabe citizen and warned that he would suppress any protests on his behalf. In late 
October 1997, a court in Dimboko, Ouattara’s birthplace cancelled his nationality certificate15. The 
news prompted violent demonstrations in Abidjan during which a number of RDR officials were 
arrested. 
 
With Bedie’s authority and popularity rapidly declining, a mutiny among soldiers who converged in 
Abidjan on 23rd December 1999 quickly escalated into a national crisis. The president initially sorted 
to appease the soldiers with the promise of improved payments. However, the troops later altered their 
demands to include the reinstatement of Guei as chief of staff.  Bedie fled to the French embassy from 
where he moved to a French military base. The unexpected coup was widely welcomed within Cote 
d’Ivoire where the Bedie regime was viewed as authoritarian and corrupt and Bedie’s last hopes of 
rallying support failed when the commanders of the gendamerie announced their support for the coup 
and deployed their forces in the city of Abidjan on Christmas day, to prevent widespread looting.16
 
3. The regime of Robert Guei 
In late January 2000, Guei, who had assumed the baton of command, promised that fresh elections 
would be held before November 1st of the same year. The central political questions became the new 
constitution and the electoral code. The publication of a draft constitution in May 2000 provoked 
renewed political crisis as the articles referring to the eligibility of candidates for the presidency 
 
14 “The Change of regime in Ivory Coast, Henri Konan Bedie rise to power”, nd. Homepage of Business Africa TM. 
Accessed on 1 Feb. 2006. <http://businessafrica.net/africabiz/wa/newswaf3.php> 
15 Siendou A. Konate, “The Politics of identity and violence in Cote d’Ivoire”, 2004. Homepage of the West African 
Review. Accessed on 18 August 2005.<http://www.westafricareview.com/issue5/konate.htm> 
16 “Ivory Coast after the coup”, 10 Apr. 2000. Homepage of the Spark. Accessed on 29 December 2005. <http://www.the-
spark.net/cs/.php?issue=27&article=3> 
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restated the position that a candidate must be born in Cote d’Ivoire to a mother and father of Ivorian 
origin. A further amendment was made to the effect that a potential presidential candidate must have 
been residing in the country for five years prior to any presidential elections.17 This was once again 
aimed at excluding Ouattara who had taken up a position as deputy director of the IMF in Washington 
in 1994, and consequently led to protests from the RDR. This further strengthened the North/South 
divide. Guei surprised observers by applying to become the candidate of the PDCI-RDA. 
 
Meanwhile, the Supreme Court upheld a ban on the participation of both Ouattara and Bedie in the 
elections leaving the field clear for two main contenders, Guei and Laurent Gbagbo.18 After the 
elections, as preliminary reports indicated that Gbagbo was taking the lead, Guei suspended the 
electoral commission and proclaimed himself winner. This in turn prompted Gbagbo’s supporters to 
stage mass street protests in support of their candidate. This was also at a time when the Organization 
of African Unity (OAU) was metamorphosing into the AU, and African leaders were very much 
against rulers who came to power through unconstitutional means. Thus, due to pressure from within 
and out of the country, Guei abdicated and fled to Benin, while Gbagbo reinstated the electoral 
commission, which published official results showing that he had received 59.4% of the votes to his 
opponent 32.7%.19 When Gbagbo refused Ouattara’s request for new elections, several weeks of 
violence ensured. Ouattara’s supporters, largely from the north, clashed with the supporters from the 
south, loyal to Gbagbo20. The targeting of populations which supported the RDR, notably immigrants 
and northerners, reached unprecedented levels, reinforcing the atmosphere of impunity of the security 
forces that had begun under the junta, and widening the political and ethnic cleavages created by 
Bedie’s “Ivoirité”. 
 
 
 
17 Regional Surveys of the World: Africa South of the Sahara (32nd ed), London: Europa Publications, 2003. p.309 
18Regional Surveys of the World: Africa South of the Sahara (33rd ed), London: Europa Publications, 2004. p.333 
19 Ibid. p.334 
20 “Timeline: Ivory Coast”, nd. Homepage of the BBC News. Accessed on 17 January 2006. 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/country_profiles/10431.stm> 
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4.  Gbagbo’s Administration and Events of 2002 
The Gbagbo government spent its first years in a constant state of paranoia, concerning a possible 
coup. An atmosphere of political uncertainty prevailed throughout 2001 amid repeated rumours of 
attempted coups by disaffected members of the army. Unidentified armed assailants perpetrated 
attacks simultaneously in Korhogo and Abidjan in January 2001 and on the gendarmerie and 
television stations. The government claimed that insurgents came from the north, implying that 
Burkina Faso was responsible, and in weeks that followed hundreds of RDR supporters were 
arrested.21
 
In mid September 2002, while Gbagbo was on a state visit to Italy, Cote d’Ivoire entered its most 
serious political crisis since independence. The planners and leaders of the coup were former soldiers 
who had been associated with General Guei’s junta in 1999, but had subsequently lost influence and 
found refuge in Burkina Faso. With limited financial support from President Blaise Campoare of 
Burkina Faso, the mutineers were able to arm, recruit, organize and launch attacks from Burkina Faso. 
In Abidjan, they killed the Minister of Interior and Decentralization, Emile Boga Doudou, a close ally 
of Gbagbo and attacked the home of Minister of Defence Moise Lida Kouassi. Guei was killed in 
Abidjan, by soldiers loyal to Gbagbo, either out of revenge or panic.22 Amid renewed inter-ethnic 
tensions and the upsurge of violence directed against northern Muslims and citizens of neighbouring 
states, Ouattara sought refuge in the German embassy before taking up residence in the French 
embassy. At the end of November, following mediation by France, he sought refuge in Gabon. 
 
As the mutiny spread rapidly across the country, gendarmes were sent to immigrant shantytowns near 
Abidjan where they burnt and destroyed homes, killing hundreds of immigrants and northerners.23 In 
the northern towns of Bouake and Korhogo, the mutineers asserted their control and distributed 
 
21 Regional Surveys of the World: Africa South of the Sahara (33rd ed), London: Europa Publications, 2004. p.333 
22 Ibid. 
23 Abdoulaye Dukule, “Violence returns to Cote d’Ivoire”, 15 Nov. 2004. Homepage of the Global Policy Forum. Accessed 
on 14 Sep. 2005. <http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/ivory/2004/1115returns.htm> 
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weapons and uniforms to new recruits. As the situation deteriorated, France sent in two hundreds 
troops who, established a base at Yamoussoukro airport in the center of the country in order to 
coordinate the evacuation of expatriates from Bouake. The US for its part deployed the same number 
of Special Forces in Korhogo, to airlift foreigners from rebel held towns.24 An emergency summit of 
ECOWAS convened in the Ghanaian capital, Accra, resolved to dispatch a peace-keeping force to act 
as a buffer between government and rebel troops, and mandated the presidents of Ghana, Guinea 
Bissau, Niger, Nigeria and Togo in addition to South African president, Thabo Mbeki, in his capacity 
as the chairman of the AU to form a “contact group” and undertake negotiations between Gbagbo and 
the insurgents. 
 
24 “Ivory Coast conflict”, Dec. 2005. Homepage of GlobalSecurity.org – Reliable Security Information. Accessed on 18 
Dec. 2005.   <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/ivory-coast.htm> 
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Chapter 3: Root Causes of Conflict in Cote d’Ivoire 
 
This chapter will argue that in order to broker a peace settlement in Cote d’Ivoire, there is a need to 
understand the root causes of conflict and the interests of all the parties involved. Thus, for the purpose 
of this paper, this section will identify the root causes of conflict in Cote d’Ivoire, and argue that the 
most noticeable and intractable causes are political and socio-economic issues. 
 
1. Battle over limited resource 
The definition of politics by Lasswell provides a clear picture of the causes of conflict in Cote 
d’Ivoire. He defines politics as being concerned with “who gets what, when and how”. This narrow 
definition is very important as it shows that resources are distributed according to the discretion of 
those in power and thus unequal allocation of resources begets a struggle, leading to the 
marginalization of certain sectors of society. For instance, the violence in Cote d’Ivoire stems from 
identity-based conflicts between different groups, national, religious or lineages over the control of 
economic, political, or social space. The bone of contention is access to land or other resources, and 
consequently this confrontation is exarcebated by the growing poverty and declining resources.25
 
The sustained marginalization and state supported injustice have created conditions for the crisis, and 
collapse that have become commonplace in postcolonial Africa. The government’s failure to equally 
distribute resources to its citizens is rooted in large part in the nature of the governing orders 
established in Africa after independence. African governments evolved practices that centralized 
power. Over-centralization has tended to breed predatory and personalized rule, and despite varying 
capabilities, many over-centralized regimes become repressive in responding to the challenges they 
face. Thus, understanding the nature of state predation and repression is critical to comprehending the 
 
25 Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja, “Citizenship, political violence, and democratization in Africa”, Global Governance, 10, 
2004. p406 
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deeper issues that undergrid conflicts, as well as the governance challenges that must be addressed in 
the constitution of post conflict governing orders.26
 
Two sets of issues resonate through much of the literature on intrastate conflict: one relates to the 
sources of conflict and the other to the nature of conflict resolution mechanisms and processes. 
Conflicts in Africa are invariably sparked off by contestations over resources. This is occurring against 
a background of economic globalization that has had an adverse effect on peripheral economies of the 
African type. In other words, these conflicts are rooted in the scarcity of resources on the continent, 
and the absence of, or failure to, craft institutions that could guarantee their equitable distribution27. 
Politics of resources distribution therefore lie at the heart of conflict in Africa. 
 
The presence of kleptocracies and rent seeking regimes in large parts of postcolonial Africa go a long 
way towards explaining the prevalence of conflict in those areas. It has been realized that conflicts 
tend to be heightened when resources become scarce and groups are either excluded, or perceive 
themselves to be excluded from the allocation of resources. Invariably, the more scarce resources are, 
the more intensely they are contested. This may not necessarily translate into immediate conflict, but 
may simply be expressed through group rivalries and may initially merely assume forms of ethnic, 
tribal or religious separatism.28
 
Conflicts in Africa become propelled by problems basic to all populations; the tugs and pulls of 
different identities, the differential distribution of resources and access to power and competing 
definitions of what is right, fair and just. Struggles over distribution of resources and the demands for 
sub national groups often spill across borders. Roger Southall and Henning Melber are quick to point 
 
26 Amos Sawyer, “Violent conflicts and governance in West Africa: the case of the Mano River Basin area”, Journal of 
Modern African Studies, 42(3), 2004. p.438 
27 Rok Ajulu, “African security: can regional organisations play a role?”, in Shannon Field (ed),  Peace in Africa, Towards 
a Collaborative Security Regime, Johannesburg: Istitute for Global Dialogue, 2004. p.267 
28 C.M Magagula, “Conflict resolution and management: the role of African higher education institutions”, 15 Nov. 2002. 
Homepage of the African Educational Research Network. Accessed on 13 Oct. 2005. 
<http://www2.ncsu.edu/ncsu/aern/confma.html> 
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that conflicts are driven by elites’s desperation to monopolise the state, given limited economic 
alternatives, in others they can be more accurately described as resources war in which the government 
and rebels are competing for control of valuable commodities29. Hence, Che Ajulu argues that at the 
heart of the conflict in Cote d’Ivoire is the battle for the control of the cocoa and coffee belt. These are 
clear indications that the struggle for scarce resources has been manipulated by the elites to maintain 
their grip on power and in the process destabilise the region.30
 
In many African conflicts however, identity is usually not the most salient in the bundle of issues that 
are at the source. Conflicts undergo metamorphosis. This is why initiatives to resolve conflict in Africa 
must reflect a deep understanding of conflict context, sources and processes going beyond simply 
working out agreements between belligerents. As important as this is, experience has shown that the 
critical challenge is not simply to provide incentives to ensure cooperation among antagonistic armed 
groups and to hold elections. More importantly, the challenge includes understanding the conflict, and 
creating and implementing appropriate settlements that have the potential to support processes of 
democratic peace-building and the constitution of post conflict governance arrangements on principles 
and along patterns that depart from approaches that have failed.31  
 
The politics of national identity, religious belonging, ethnic cleavages, feeling of exclusion and 
perceptions of who is and who is not a “true or pure” Ivorian need to be understood as a by-product of 
struggle over resources such as the control of coffee and cocoa in Cote d’Ivoire. The struggle for 
diminishing resources led to the marginalization and exclusion of some government officials from 
effectively participating in the political future of the country. For example, under Boigny, when 
resources were abundant and his grip on the political machinery quite firm, it was not difficult to 
 
29 Roger Southall, Neo Simutanyi and John Daniel, “Former presidents in African politics”, in  Roger Southall and 
Henning Melber (eds), Legacies of Power: Leadership Change and Former Presidents in African Politics, Cape Town: 
Human Science Research Council, 2006. p 18 
30 Che Ajulu, “Cote d’Ivoire: a regional quandary”, Global Insight: a focus on current issues, 37, Sep. 2004. p,3 
31 Stephen John Stedman, “Conflict and conflict resolution in Africa: a conceptual framework”, in Francis Deng and 
Willian Zartman (eds), Conflict Resolution in Africa, Washington: The Brookings Institute, 1991. p.368 
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control competing elites and hence buy their loyalties. However, with his demise and the country’s 
rapidly shrinking economic resource base, partly due to globalisation, the new elites had to find ways 
of managing those resources. Bedie’s strategy was therefore to exclude segments of the political class 
from sharing in the largesse of the state.32
 
2. Political dimension: Politics of inclusion vs politics of exclusion 
The political manifestation of the Ivorian crisis is centred around the politics of nationality and identity 
that have become exclusionary since the death of Houphouet Boigny. The politics of exclusion has led 
to the division of the country into North and South. This division has compelled some factions to take 
up arms to fight their exclusion from the government institutions and therefore, the most fundamental 
question that needs to be addressed in Cote d’Ivoire is the ever growing animosity between the citizens 
form the North and those from the South.  
 
Significantly, politics of exclusion in Cote d’Ivoire could be traced back to 1990 when President 
Houphouet Boingy introduced the multi-party politics. Opposition groups which had previously 
operated unofficially had by 1990 acquired legal status. A good number of political parties were 
formed. For instance, the concept of Ivoirité reportedly originated in the late 1960s and early 1970s 
among Ivorian intellectuals who were merely giving a cultural expression to their nationalism. This 
concept was so popular that even Houphouet Boigny in the 1970s adopted it and used it to ensure that 
only Ivorians were allowed to serve in the public service of the country. This led to the sacking of 
foreigners or immigrants who had hitherto served in such capacity. It was the actual beginning of 
xenophobia in official practice. In the hands of Laurent Gbagbo, Ivoirité has moved beyond a mere 
intellectual concept and has been transformed into a weapon for excluding political opponents like 
Alassane Ouattara. The concept re-emerged in a more powerful manner on the political terrain with the 
election of Konan Bedie to the presidency in 1995. Since then it has become associated with 
 
32 Abdul Rahman Lamin, Conflict in Cote d’Ivoire: South Africa’s Diplomacy and Prospects for Peace, Johannesburg: 
Institute for Global Dialogue, 2005. p14 
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xenophobia and racism, a dangerous instruments in the hands of Laurent Gbagbo to exclude his main 
political rival, Ouattara, from seeking election to the presidency.33
 
Therefore, incumbent governments tend to uncharacteristically use repressive measures to further 
exclude some sectors of the society. Ajulu maintains that exclusion from the national democratic 
processes and the experience of state repression has legitimized violence as a means to effect social 
change within both the youth and warlord structures. Violence has become intstitutionalised as a 
means of maintaining internal social cohesion and meeting basic material needs. Leadership within 
these structures have a strong vested interest in the perpetuation of violent conflict. Thus, violence has 
been used by both the state and the rebel forces as a means to retard or secure political change34.  
 
Immdediately upon the death of Boigny, every possible diabolical plan was hatched to prevent Prime 
Minister Alassane Ouattara from ever becoming president. Henri Konan Bedie, who held the 
presidency of the National Assembly at the time, eventually succeeded Boigny after a brief power 
tussle. From that moment onwards Ouatarra’s political troubles and victimization began. Bedie, 
apparently scared of Ouattara’s popularity, resorted to the spurious allegation that Ouattara was not a 
true Ivorian, as his parents were said to be originally from Burkina Faso, thus effectively excluding 
and disqualifying him from standing for national elections. This began a period of political crisis and 
instability, punctuated by ethnically motivated bloodshed, from which the country has yet to escape.35 
Hence, when Gbagbo came to power, he maintained article 35 of the Ivorian constituion. 
 
Article 35 of the Ivorian constituion became a bone of political contestation and has led to one of the 
bloodiest conflict, recently in Africa. The article excludes those who don’t have both parents as 
Ivorians, from citizenship and landownership, as well as being excluded from being elected to the 
 
33 Alade W Fawole, “Ecowas and the crisis in Cote d’Ivoire: the politics and problems of peace-making in West Africa”, 
Journal of West African Affairs, 4(2), 2004. p.15 
34 Rok Ajulu, “ Political violence in South Africa: a rejoinder to Morris and Hindson ”, Africa Review of Political 
Economy, 55, 1992. p.68 
35 Alade W Fawole, “Ecowas and the crisis in Cote d’Ivoire: the politics and problems of peace-making in West Africa”, 
Journal of West African Affairs, 4(2), 2004. p.16 
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independent electoral body. Therefore, article 35 of the constitution has led to the frustration of many 
Ivorians from the north since they have been perceived as “half Ivorians” because there is a rumour 
that their parents came as immigrants from neighbouring countries such as Burkina Faso, Mali, 
Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Ghana, Guinea and Niger. In fact, Alade Fawole aptly puts it that Cote 
d’Ivoire has a peculiar demographic characteristic. About one-fifth of its population is made up of 
immigrants from the neighbouring states of West Africa, mostly Burkinabes, Malians, Guineans, 
Senegalese, Ghananians and Nigerians. These diverse nationalities had settled and lived in the country 
for generations, mostly working in the cocoa and other crop plantations. Throughout the country’s 
history since independence, foreign African residents had been subjected to occasional orchestrated 
xenophobia, discrimination and hostility. In fact, Gbagbo especially had been associated with anti-
immigrant political postures, even during Boigny’s rule. He openly accused Boigny of allowing 
foreign residents to vote in the country’s general elections. Thus, it is not surprising that Gbagbo was 
associated with the overt and covert moves to deny Ouattara his citizenship rights and persecute his 
regional loyalists. Gbagbo’s policies and Artcicle 35 have consciously encouraged greater ethnic 
consciousness and discrimination that is currently tearing the once peaceful nation apart36. When 
Gbagbo, based on Article 35 refused Ouattara’s request for new elections, several weeks of violence 
ensured and the country became a theatre of conflict. 
 
The targeting of populations which supported the RDR notably immigrants and northerners reached 
unprecedented levels reinforcing the air of impunity of security forces that had begun under the junta 
and widening the political exclusion, national identity and ethnic cleavages created by Bedie’s policy 
of “Ivoirité”. As a result, politics of exclusion did not only express themselves on presidential 
candidancy but also aimed at the communities represented by Alassane Ouattara. 
 
 
 
36 Ibid. p.17 
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3. Relative deprivation theory and ethnic polarization 
The bloodiest civil war in Cote d’Ivoire has led to ethnic polarisation between people from the north 
and those from the south. Many lives have been lost and many have sought refuge elsewhere. The 
relative deprivation theory helps to explain the social cleavages between those who want to enrich 
themselves by tenaciously clinging on to power and those who feel absolutely deprived by the 
government’s decision to determine who should or should not run for presidential election. 
 
The relative deprivation theory shows an intractable element of conflict and a wide political and 
economic discrimination in the allocation of resources between different ehnic groups living in the 
same country. As a result, this theory is more concerned with a perception of unequal distribution of 
resources such as a wide gap in income and occupation. Hence, relative deprivation theory helps to 
highlight the perception that other ethnic groups are relatively more advantaged than others.  
Verstegen argues that constitutional inclusion between ethnic religious, or language groups, regional 
inequalities, class inequalities, the forms in which power relations are institutionalized, and so on…is a 
consequence of socio-economic exploitation and exclusion and the end result of deliberate actions or a 
a lack of distributive mechanisms of central authority. Exclusion and downward mobility are here seen 
as the processes of relative and absolute impoverishment, which is in many cases the reverse image of 
the enrichment of another group. It is, more, a question of perceptions and relative deprivation.37
 
In all African countries the state is seen as the major distributor of resources to its citizens but more 
often these resources are allocated according to ethnic, language, location and religious belonging. 
Subsequently, people with ethnic differences from those who hold power tend to suffer from gaining 
access to state apparatus and consequently are excluded from gaining a total share of their country’s 
wealth and resources. As a result, features such as ethinicity, language and religion are highly 
policiticed to ignite a conflict. Maoz explains that “national decision makers wish to satisfy some 
 
37 Suzanne Verstegen, “Poverty and conflict: an entitlement perspective”, 2001. Homepage of the Clingendael Centre of 
International Relations. Accessed on 7 February 2006. 
<http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2001/20010900_cru_other_verstegen.pdf> 
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tangible needs of their constituencies at the expense of other groups”.38 Conflicts in Africa are 
exacerbated by perceptions and the feeling of discrimination based on dominance, hostility, 
xenophobia and perhaps the feeling of superiority and inferiority. For instance, the feeling of 
discrimination and neglect of the northerners by the southerners intensified after the death of Boigny, 
forced the incumbent government to design policies that were perceived as favouring forces loyal to 
Gbagbo. Thus Naomi, Ravenhill, Mortimer and Rothchild collectively argue that:  
Conflicts are concerned not only with the way power is exercised but also with the purposes of governance; 
they may present challenges to policy, to the incumbents of public office, or to the dominant political vision. At 
issues, therefore, are question of authority and power as well as legitimacy. Participation, cooperation, 
dissatisfaction, protest, rebellion and civil war are all ways of reaching to specific regimes39. 
 
The regional division of communities in Cote d’Ivoire has heightened the perception of national and 
political identity as well as religious belonging. Indeed, southerners have felt relatively deprived from 
land ownership and benefiting resources thereof. Subsequently, leaders from both communities sought 
for a support along ethnic belonging and religious affiliations. Hence, Ousmane Kane explains that a 
new perspective on citizenship based on Ivoirité was promoted in the 1990s under the regime of 
Konan Bedie. The aim of this approach to citizenship was to prevent Alassane Ouattara, a former 
Prime Minister under Felix Boingy and a political rival to Bedie from contesting the presidential 
elections. Yet, this led to the deprivation and marginalization of nearly one-fourth of the people who 
currently live in Cote d’Ivoire40. 
 
A further amendment of article 35 of the Ivorian constitution has created a climate of exclusion and 
cemented the already existing perceptions of alienation and marginalization from accessing the 
country’s limited resources. Provoked by these perceptions, northern leaders have taken up arms to 
confront their marginalization from the political and election participation. 
 
 
38 Zeev Maoz, Paths to Conflict: International Dispute Initiation 1816-1976, Boulder: Westview Press, 1982. P.84 
39 Naomi Chazan, Robert Mortimer, John Ravenhill & Donald Rothchild, Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa, 
Boulder: Lynne Reinner, 1992. p.189 
40 Ousmane Kane, “Le mot des redacteur-en-chef”, Identité, Culture et Politique, 3(2), 2002. p.V. 
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On the other hand, the languid policy of Ivoirité incarnated successively by Konan Bedie, Robert Guei 
and President Laurent Gbagbo continued to reflect the progressive disengagement of citizens from the 
north. To worsen matters, Gbagbo, who took power from Guei after a controversial election in 2000, 
has also been encouraging systematic xenophobia in order to remain in power. At the receiving end of 
his politics of exclusion are mostly Northern Muslims from Ouattara’s home region. One consequence 
of such ugly political developments is the current civil war in the country. It was sparked by military 
personnel of northern origin who were cashiered from the army and police forces purely on suspicion 
of being sympathetic to the opposition, especially to Ouattara. They struck with the intention to 
overthrow the regime and possibly reverse the egregious political deprivation and marginalisation their 
region had suffered. But when this initial objective failed, their refusal to lay down their arms 
subsequently allowed the mutiny to fester into a civil war41. The government claimed the insurgents 
came from the north implying that Burkina Faso was responsible and, in the weeks that followed, 
hundreds of RDR supporters were arrested. As the unrest grew and mutiny spread rapidly across the 
country, gendarmes were sent to immigrants shantytowns near Abidjan where they burnt and 
destroyed homes, thereby, killing hundreds of immigrants and northerners. In the northern towns of 
Bouake and Korhogo, the mutineers asserted their control and distributed weapons and uniforms to 
new recruits. 
 
Against this backdrop, relative deprivation theory helps to explain the north and south divide and 
hostilities based on perceptions of national identity and religious beliefs. Given the political and 
military dominance of the government which is based on southern domination, leaders from north 
have taken up arms as a last resort to fight their exclusion that is deeply entrenched on perceptions of 
who is and who is not a “true or pure” Ivorian. As a result, these perceptions have caused one of the 
bloodiest conflicts in Africa.  
 
41 Alade W Fawole, “Ecowas and the crisis in Cote d’Ivoire: the politics and problems of peace-making in West Africa”, 
Journal of West African Affairs, 4(2), 2004. p.16 
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Therefore, any third party mediation must ensure that it fully understand issues that undergrid the 
already existing differences between the north and the south communities.  
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Chapter 4: Giving Mediators a chance: Perspective on peace 
 
This chapter examines the role of third party mediation in trying to broker a peace agreement in Cote 
d’Ivoire. It also examines reasons for the failure to implement the French-brokered Linas Marcoussis 
as well as the little success of the Accra Accords. This failure of both agreements provides an 
understanding of events that led to the Pretoria Accords under the auspices of South Africa. 
 
In mid September 2002, while Gbagbo was on a state visit to Italy, Cote d’Ivoire entered its most 
serious political crisis since independence42. 
 
As the unrest grew and mutiny spread rapidly across the country, gendarmes were sent to immigrants 
shantytowns near Abidjan where they burnt and destroyed homes and thereby killing hundreds of 
immigrants and northerners. In the northern towns of Bouake and Korhogo, the mutineers asserted 
their control and distributed weapons and uniforms to new recruits. As the situation deteriorated, 
France sent in two hundred troops who, established a base at Yamoussoukro airport in the center of the 
country in order to coordinate the evacuation of expatriates from Bouake. The United States for its part 
deployed the same number of Special Forces Korhogo to airlift foreigners from rebel held towns.43 An 
emergency summit of ECOWAS, convened in Accra, Ghana, resolved to dispatch a peace keeping 
force to act as a buffer between government and rebel troops and mandated the presidents of Ghana, 
Guinea Bissau, Niger, Nigeria and Togo in addition to South African President Thabo Mbeki in his 
capacity as a chairman of the AU, to form a contact group and undertake negotiations between Gbagbo 
and the insurgents. 
 
 
 
42 See Chapter 2, section 4, p.13 of this study. 
43 “Ivory Coast conflict”, Dec. 2005. Homepage of GlobalSecurity.org – Reliable Security Information. Accessed on 18 
Dec. 2005.   <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/ivory-coast.htm> 
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1. The Linas Marcoussis Peace Agreement 
In January 2003, the French president, Jacques Chirac, organized a round table with the Ivorian 
political forces in the French resort town of Linas Marcoussis. It brought together representatives of all 
existing political parties in Cote d’Ivoire as well as non-political representatives. Each delegation gave 
its analysis of the situation in the Cote d’Ivoire and made proposals aimed at restoring confidence and 
overcoming the crisis. The vision given by the delegations enabled the round table to come to a 
consensus, in which all elements, principles and annexes have the same status.44   
 
1.1  Ceasefire 
The round-table welcomed the cease-fire, made possible and guaranteed by the deployment of 
ECOWAS forces, supported by French troops, and demanded strict compliance with its terms. The 
Linas Marcoussis Agreement as popularly known, called on all parties to immediately put a stop to all 
exactions and concentrate on the peace process. The Agreement reiterated the need to maintain the 
territorial integrity of Cote d’Ivoire and respect for its political and economic institutions, and to 
restore the authority of the state. It recalled its commitment to the principle of democratic accession 
and exercise of power.45
 
1.2  The Government of National Reconciliation 
 The Linas-Marcoussis Agreement provided for the formation of a Government of National 
Reconciliation to ensure a return to peace and stability. It was agreed that the Government of National 
Reconciliation would be led by a consensus Prime Minister who would remain in office until 
presidential elections were organized, and that the interim prime minister would not be eligible to 
stand as a candidate in the elections. The government would be composed of representatives from each 
 
44 “Peace agreements, digital collection: Cote d’Ivoire (English)”, 14 Feb 2004. Homepage of the United States Institute for 
Peace. Accessed on 12 Oct.2005. <http://www.usip.org/library/pa/cote_divoire/cote_divoire_01242003en.html> 
45 Ibid. 
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of the Ivorian delegations that took part in the round-table. In assigning ministers, a balance was to be 
struck among the parties throughout the term of office of the government46
 
1.3  Citizenship and identity 
On the issue of citizenship, identity and status of foreign nationals, the round-table considered that the 
issue of Ivorian citizenship as amendend to make broad provisions for naturalization by certificate 
issued by the public authorities was a generous and well-drafted text. The round table observed a 
degree of legal difficulty in applying Articles 6 and 7 of the citizenship code. The difficulty was 
compounded by the fact that in practice, the certificate of citizenship is valid for three months only, 
and that the person holding it must prove his or her citizenship each time it is renewed, by producing a 
number of documents.47 Therefore, the Government of National Reconciliation was called upon to : 
immediately promote increased recourse of existing naturalization procedures, based on better 
information and possible cooperation projects which were to be implemented with the support of 
international development partners.48
 
Furthermore, the Government of National Reconciliation was tasked with coping with the uncertainty 
and slow pace of the identification process as well as the errors and abuses which arose from the 
scrupulous nature in which security checks were conducted. It was equally stated that the Government 
of National Reconciliation had to take further action with respect to registration and identification of 
individuals in particular. The round-table found that foreign nationals residing in large numbers in 
Cote d’Ivoire had made a major contribution to national wealth and helped confer on Cote d’Ivoire its 
special position and responsibility within the sub-region, as it has also benefited the countries of origin 
of these foreign nationals-and considered that the petty announcements perpetrated by the 
 
46 Ibid. 
47 Linas Marcoussis Agreement January 2003, Signed by Various Parties To the Ivorian Conflict in the French Resort 
Town of Linas Marcoussis, English Version. 
48 Claudio Gramizzi, “La Paix s’eloigne de Cote d’Ivoire”, 14 Nov. 2004. Homepage of RESO – Réformistes et Solidaires. 
Accessed on 13 Sep. 2005. <http://www.re-so.net/article.php3?id_article=377> 
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administration which often disregarded the law and human rights and in turn, affected such nationals 
could have been caused by willful misapplication of identification provision.49
 
The Government of National Reconciliation was charged with the elimination of the residence permit 
requirements under Article 8 paragraph 2 of law 2002-03 of January 3 2002 for nationals of ECOWAS 
countries and was to carry out the immigration inspection needed by using means of identification not 
subject to fraudulent misuse. Moreover, the Government of National Reconciliation was to consider 
introducing legislative and regulatory provisions to improve the status of foreign nationals and protect 
their property.50
 
1.4  The judiciary system    
On the question of the electoral system, the round table considered that law 20004-514 of August 2000 
in the electoral code raised no difficulties and that the reflected efforts to improve the text of the laws 
that law 2001-634 of 9 January 2001 which created the Independent Electoral Commission, constituted 
significant progress in ensuring the organization of transparent elections. The Government of National 
Reconciliation was therefore called upon to ensure impartiality of the measures taken to identify voters 
and the drawing up of voter’s lists and to submit a bill relating to the status of the opposition and to the 
public funding of political parties and elections campaign within six months. The Government of 
National Reconciliation was also to take all appropriate measures to ensure the independence of the 
judicial system and the impartiality of the media with respect to both election disputes and election 
propaganda.51
 
 
 
 
49 Linas Marcoussis Peace Accords, Annex, Programme of the Government of National Reconciliation on the Question of 
Citizenship, Identity, and status of Foreign Nationals. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Linas Marcoussis Peace Accords, Annex on the Question of the Electoral system. 
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1.5  Revisiting Article 35 
With regard to the issue of eligibility for the Presidency of the Republic, the round-table considered 
that Article 35 must avoid referring to concepts without legal concept or which are derived from the 
legislation. The Government of National Reconciliation was therefore called upon to propose that 
conditions governing eligibility to run for the presidency of the Republic be laid down as follows: 
The President of the Republic is elected by universal suffrage to a five year term of office. He can be reelected 
only once. The candidate must be in possession of his civil and political rights and be at least thirty five years 
of age. He must have only Ivorian citizenship and have a father or mother born Ivorian.52
 
The round-table condemned the incitement of hatred and xenophobia propagated in certain quarters by 
the media, and called on the Government of National Reconciliation to overhaul the general regime 
governing the press so as to strengthen the role of the regulatory authorities, guarantee neutrality and 
impartiality of state broadcasters and foster the financial independence of the media. It was to restore 
immediately the free broadcasting of the international radio and television media.53
 
1.6  Demobilization and disarmament programme 
On the subject of regrouping, disarming and demobilizing, the Government of National Reconciliation 
was called upon to undertake the process of concomitant regrouping of the forces on the ground under 
the supervision of both ECOWAS and French forces. In the second phase, the Government of National 
Reconciliation was asked to ensure the social reintegration of military personnel of every origin with 
the help of Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Resettlement, and Reintegration (DDRRR) 
type programmes which could be implemented with the support of international development partners. 
The Government of National Reconciliation was to carry out an audit of its armed forces and 
determine the level of sacrifice which it could accept in order to meet its obligations with respect to 
 
52 Linas Marcoussis Peace Accords, Annex on the issue of eligibility to the Presidency of the Republic 
53 West African Early Warning Network (WARN),  “Crisis in Cote d’Ivoire-‘Pax Marcoussis’: emerging challenges and 
prospects”, 18 Dec. 2003. Homepage of Relief Web. Accessed on 14 Nov. 2005. 
<http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/AllDocsByUNID/edaa3c76b664538fc1256e200045725f> 
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national defence in a difficult economic context. It would restructure the armed forces and request 
outside assistance for this purpose.54
 
Finally, the Government of National Reconciliation was to ensure that the constitutional, legislative 
and regulatory reforms which arose from the decisions it made be introduced without delay. 
 
1.7  Analysis of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement 
The Linas Marcoussis Accord was quickly compromised by a lack of commitment and political will 
by the various parties. The central issues in the conflict notably, nationality and eligibility to run for 
presidential elections, along with disarmament were not satisfactorily addressed.  
 
In addition, Ministers belonging to the former rebel groups left the Government of National 
Reconciliation accusing President Gbagbo of failing to delegate executive powers to the Prime 
Minister and the coalition government as demanded by the Agreement.55 Thus, opposition parties left 
the government while Forces Nouvelles, remnants of the armed group that attempted a coup in 
September 2002 and subsequently took control of the north of the country, refused to disarm until after 
the elections. Laurent Gbagbo had repeatedly repudiated the terms of the Accord, which he referred to 
as no more than a set of proposals his opponents contend. Hence, the peace process faltered. 
 
After the signing of the accords, pro FPI youth held demonstrations in Abidjan and targeted French 
residents and their property. This led to the separation of thousands of French citizens from Cote 
d’Ivoire. The accords, according to the youth loyal to Gbagbo, have legitimized the rebellion. 
 
The Linas-Marcoussis called upon the incumbent government and the rebels to begin the process of 
disarmament programme, the respect of democracy, end to discrimination based on identity and 
 
54 Linas Marcoussis Peace Accords, Annex on the issue of Regrouping, Diarming and Demobilizing. 
55 Gail Wannenburg and Nuria Giralt, “West Africa: A review of the region”, in South African Yearbook of International 
Affairs 2003/2004, Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs,  2004. p.85 
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citizenship and the need to restructure the security of the country. These agreements were not 
implemented because members of the rebel forces resigned from the government citing reasons that 
Gbagbo had failed to respect and implement the outcomes of the peace accord. Thus, Gbagbo was 
accused of violating the agreements made in the Linas Marcoussis and the peace process failed. Gail 
Wannenburg and Nuria Giralt succinctly put it that in September 2003, ministers belonging to the to 
the former rebel groups resigned because they said Gbagbo had failed to delegate executive powers to 
the prime minister and coalition coalition government, and had appointed the key security ministers, in 
contravention of the accord.56
 
In addition, one could argue that from the onset, Gbagbo was unwilling to respect agreements of the 
Linas-Marcoussis Accords. He has on various occasions delayed the peace process, because he 
harbours fears that if free and fair elections are organized and held in October 2005, he could be 
defeated. 
 
2. The Accra Accords 
The Accra Accords did not really differ from the issues outlined in the Linas Marcoussis peace 
Agreement. The meeting in Accra was to persuade Ivorian leaders to recommit themselves to 
implement the outstanding issues in the Linas Marcoussis Agreement. Therefore, on July 31 the Accra 
Agreement was signed with the goal of bringing the peace-process back on track. The agreement was 
the result of heavy pressure from several African leaders and United Nations (UN) Secretary General 
Kofi Annan. Key elements of the agreement were to make it easier for West African immigrants and 
their descendants to gain Ivorian nationality as well as title to the land they had worked on for decades. 
It was also designed to allow their children to inherit that land; to set up constitutional reform that 
made it easier for immigrants to become president; and, crucially, to come to an agreement calling for 
 
56 Ibid. 
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beginning the process of the disarmament, demobilization, and rehabilitation, which was to be 
completed by October 15 at the latest.  
 
In addition, the agreement also called on President Gbagbo to formalize the specific powers to be held 
by the Prime Minister Seydou Diarra. The implementation of the agreement was to be closely 
monitored by the UN and ECOWAS. Soon after the Accra Agreement was reached, power was 
delegated to Diarra and a mixed police unit made up of rebels and government forces were created. 
However other reforms were not as successful, having been held up in parliament. Doubt was also cast 
upon the potential success of the disarmament plan, largely because the insurgents feared that they 
would lose their political leverage if they were to surrender their weapons. As the October 15 deadline 
approached, tension grew in the country, as the rebels refused to disarm arguing that the government 
had failed to implement reforms57.  
 
Cognizance of this continuous political impasse, President John Kufour, the chair of ECOWAS, 
invited signatories of the Linas-Marcoussis Accords along with head of states of the AU in Accra on 
29-30July 2004 to re-examine the Ivorian crisis. The meeting saw the participation of more than 18 
AU heads of states, including Alpha Omar Konare, President of the AU Commission, and Mohammed 
Ibn Chambas, Executive Secretary of the ECOWAS. The Ivorian parties were called upon by John 
Kufour to re-present their problems and to postulate to postulate the extent to which the government of 
reconciliation could accommodate their grievances. After serious robust debates, the participants 
resolved to fast track the implementation of the Linas-Marcoussis agreement and Accra I and II 
Accords. They also pledged to support the president in using his discretionary powers to revise Article 
35 of the Constitution. Parties at the Accra III also reiterated their commitment to support and 
guarantee the adoption of legislation, decrees and political reforms before the end of August 2004 as 
 
57 “Ivory Coast conflict”, Dec. 2005. Homepage of GlobalSecurity.org – Reliable Security Information. Accessed on 18 
Dec. 2005.   <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/ivory-coast.htm> 
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stated in the Linas-Marcoussis agreement. Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of the 
militias was to be effected on the October 15 200458
 
The Accra III was therefore seen as the most comprehensive agreement since Linas-Marcoussis. It 
stipulated specific time frames and a clear road map for the attainment of peace and security in Cote 
d’Ivoire. It ordered the disarmament of the militias and rebels, something that the other peace accords 
on Cote d’Ivoire had failed to emphasize. The Accra III also called for the delegation of executive 
powers to the prime minister according to Article 56 of the Ivorian Constituion. This position taken by 
the Ivorian government was unprecedented as many African leaders have always wanted to wield all 
executive powers even when it seems those powers are slipping away. The Accra III agreement was 
also hailed as it advocated the creation of an International Commission of Inquiry to investigate the 
abuse of human rights and insinuated that such abusers should be punished according to the 
international law.59
 
Unsurprisingly, no stakeholders in the Ivorian debacle adhered to the timeframes put forth by the 
Accra III accord. In November 2004, rebels had not disarmed neither had they been integrated into the 
Ivorian army as agreed in various peace accords. 
 
Trampling on the Linas Marcoussis accords and the Accra accords Gbagbo, on November 4 2004, 
launched “Operation Dignity”, an air and land offensive against the positions of the Forces Nouvelles. 
In the course of the operation, the Forces Armées Nationales de Côte d’Ivoire (FANCI) air force 
“mistakenly” bombed a French military camp in Bouake, the zone controlled by the Force Nouvelles. 
The attack left nine French soldiers and a US civilian dead60. The French reacted by destroying the 
 
58 Ibid 
59 Ibid 
60 Jean Nanga, “Ivory Coast: a ‘civil war’ that is French and neo-colonial, Feb. 2005. Homepage of international Viewpoint 
– News and Analysis from the Fourth International. Accessed on 12 Sep. 2005. 
<http://212.67.202.147/~ivnet05/print_article.php3?id_article=553> 
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aircraft that had carried out the attack, and following orders from the French President Jacques Chirac, 
destroyed the entire Ivorian air force. 
 
 This disproportionate response sparked off a mobilization of Gbagbo’s supporters in Abidjan. Anti 
French and anti-opposition violence took place, and demonstrators headed for the permanent French 
base of the 43rd Batallion of Marine Infantry (BIMA), as well as the airport and the Hotel d’Ivoire, 
occupied by the French army.61 Furthermore, Lamin notes that ideologically, Gbagbo had been mostly 
opposed to French manipulation of Ivorian politics, since the Boigny’s days. He had, therefore, 
historically been suspicious of France’s, and more precisely Chirac’s, political involvement in Cote 
d’Ivoire. Although the French authorities welcomed Gbagbo in Paris following his controversial 
elections in 2000, and subsequently lifted sanctions imposed on the country after Guei’s 1999 coup 
d’etat, clearly Gbagbo’relationship with the former colonial power was superficial. The Linas-
Marcoussis process thus provided an opportunity for Gbagbo and his supporters clearly to undercut 
France’s involvement in Cote d’Ivoire.62 This is because Gbagbo is perceived by France as a new 
leader, not prepared to bow down to their interests and privileges in the country. It should also be 
remembered that Gbagbo led a demonstration against French interests involving students in the 1970s. 
Thus, the French government would no doubt like to see the major concessions continue in French 
hands, and are clearly worried about Gbagbo’s independence63. 
 
It was at this point in the crisis that South Africa, under President Thabo Mbeki, was mandated by the 
AU and the ECOWAS to engage the Ivorian government, the northern rebels and the political 
opposition in a new process. After his visit to Cote d’Ivoire in November 2004, President Thabo 
Mbeki announced that an agreement on a four-point plan had been reached. He stated that the Ivorian 
 
61 “Cote d’Ivoire: row develops over killing by French troops”, 1 Dec. 2004. Homepage of the United Nations Integrated 
Regional Information Networks – OCHA IRIN. Accessed on 11 Nov. 2005. 
<http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=44470&SelectRegion=West_Africa&SelectCountry=COTE_D_IVOIRE> 
62 Abdul Rahman Lamin, Conflict in Cote d’Ivoire: South Africa’s Diplomacy and Prospects for Peace, Johannesburg: 
Institute for Global Dialogue, 2005. p.19 
63 International Crisis Group (ICG),  “ Cote d’Ivoire: the war is not over yet ”, ICG Africa Report, 2003. p.30. 
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government, President Laurent Gbagbo, opposition parties and the country’s main rebel movements 
had accepted that “specific programmes be carried out”.64 The agreement aimed at reviving the 
faltering peace process which provided for the government to implement legislative changes, with the 
rebels required to start making progress with their own disarmament. 
 
One of the key legal challenges to be implemented by Gbagbo’s government concerns Article 35 
which specifies that the mother and father of presidential candidates must be Ivorian by birth.65 The 
purpose of the renewed negotiations was to get the government to change that clause so that only one 
parent needs to be born in Cote d’Ivoire. Such a change would open the way for opposition leader, 
Ouattara, and other northerners to contest the forthcoming elections and in the long run diffuse the 
long-standing division between northerners and southerners in the country. It is important to note that 
with South Africa’s involvement in the mediation process and even Gbagbo had announced a decree 
repealing Article 35, the peace process stalled afterwards. 
 
3. Pretoria Accords 
The South African president Thabo Mbeki, in his attempt to broker a peace deal in Cote d’Ivoire, 
equally met leaders of various factions of Cote d’Ivoire in Pretoria in April 2005 to further discuss the 
road map to peace and reconciliation in that country. He received Allasane Ouattara former Prime 
Minister and leader of the RDR party, Lambert Kouassi Konan, Vice President of the Ivorian 
Democratic Party and the main rebel leader Gillaume Soro.66
 
 Leaders from Cote d’Ivoire went to South Africa in search of a new deal since both Linas-Marcoussis 
and Accra agreements had failed. 
 
64 Integrated Regional Information Network, “Mbeki Reports on Peace Mission as Opposition Accuses Gbagbo of 
Preparing For War”, 11 Jan. 2005. Homepage of the Global Policy Forum. Accessed on 13 Jan. 2005. 
<http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/ivory/2005/0111resume.htm> 
65 “Cote d’Ivoire: all sides pledge commitment to peace process again, but will anything change?”, 7 Dec. 2004. Homepage 
of the United Nations Integrated Regional Information Networks – OCHA IRIN. Accessed on 11 Nov. 2005.  
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66 “Rebels to meet Mbeki again”, 17 Dec. 2004. Homepage of News24.com. Accessed on 11 Nov.2005. 
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 Under the Pretoria Agreement negotiated by Mbeki, leaders from the various parties pledged to 
commit themselves to end the civil war in Cote d’Ivoire. Consequently, the Pretoria accord mandated 
all the parties to agree immmediately and to proceed with the disarmament and the dismantling of the 
various groups. Furthermore, it was agreed, on the one hand, that the Prime Minister will oversee the 
process of the disarmament and the dismantling of the rebels; President Gbagbo, on the other hand, 
will have to ensure that the units of the Defence and Security Forces work together with the Prime 
Minister in the implementation of the disarmament and dismantling program. 
 
 The accord also persuaded all belligerent groups to agree that the Chief of Staff of the National 
Armed Forces of the Cote d’Ivoire and the Armed Forces of the New Forces should set up a meeting 
as soon as possible to begin the implementation of the National Disarmament, Demobilization and 
Reintegration Plan (PNDDR). According to news report The City Press, rebel leaders as well as 
President Gbagbo all committed themselves towards working together for peace, disarmament, 
demobilization and the integration of all armed forces into a single force. 
 
With the above-mentioned outcome of the meeting and optimism in the air, the question that needs to 
be posed is: what difference can South Africa make in Cote d’Ivoire’s search for peace, given the 
failure of other third parties?. First, it is important to note that the French position has also been the 
least ambivalent, as they have been accused by the government of Cote d’Ivoire as well as the rebels 
of taking sides in the conflict. This has in the past sparked anti-French sentiments in the country and 
led to the expulsion of thousands of French citizens. France no longer had the legitimacy as a neutral 
mediator. Seemingly, ECOWAS failed to provide solution to the Ivorian crisis. Hence, AU and 
ECOWAS mandated South Africa to continue with process of resolving the conflict. 
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Essentially, one argues that the Pretoria accord does not bring a new deal to the negotiation table. In 
fact, Mbeki argued that the French-brokered agreement remains effectively the blueprint for Ivorian 
peace. Furthermore, Lamin further suggests that the Pretoria Agreement of April 2005 does not in any 
way differ much from the Linas-Marcoussis and Accra accords. Like its predecessors, the new 
agreement addresses both political and security issues. Politically, the Pretoria Agreement provides for 
the reunification of the country by securing commitments from the New Forces to rejoin the power-
sharing government agreed to under the Linas-Marcoussis. We should be reminded that South Africa’s 
involvement in the peace process came in the wake of the withdrawal of rebels’ ministers from the 
Gbagbo-led government, on the grounds that the president had failed to delegate, in any substantial 
way, executive authority to the Prime Minister, as stipulated under Linas-Marcoussis and Accra 
agreements.67
 
Seeing that South Africa is not coming up with any changes in the peace talks that are already 
mystified with bad faith and lack of trust amongst warring factors to implement all the accords, the 
new question appears: why was South Africa designated to broker a peace deal in Cote d’Ivoire in 
November 2004, rather than four years ago, when the conflict was in its early stages? Moreover, can 
South Africa really export its model of peacemaking such as power-sharing in politically and socially 
divide in societies such as Cote d’Ivoire?  
 
The following chapter will highlight why South Africa was given the responsibility of brokering peace 
in the country, and will analyse the progess that has been made so far. 
 
 
67 Abdul Rahman Lamin, Conflict in Cote d’Ivoire: South Africa’s Diplomacy and Prospects for Peace, Johannesburg: 
Institute for Global Dialogue, 2005. p.24 
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Chapter 5: Why South Africa? 
 
The peaceful end of apartheid in South Africa in 1994 and its economic and political developments 
since then has made the country a model and skilful negotiator and peace-broker in many conflicts in 
Africa. Thus, the past ten years of diplomatic engagement in conflict zones have prepared South 
Africa to become not only experienced as peace-broker but, to some extent, experts in conflict 
management. This has been bolstered by the fact that South Africa remains the economic power-house 
in the continent. 
 
Therefore, the economic, human resource and international reputation of South Africa’s role in 
conflict management, place the country in a better position to broker a peace deal in Cote d’Ivoire. 
Hence the AU could not ignore South Africa’s ability and capacity to bring peace in Cote d’Ivoire. 
 
Furthermore, South Africa’s neutrality and history gives it a moral authority in Africa that many 
Western countries cannot claim. From Burundi, and the DRC, through Darfur and now to Cote 
d’Ivoire, President Mbeki has drawn on his standing to try to spread peace across the continent, 
demonstrating to the world that Africa can be relied upon to solve its own problems. Thabo Mbeki has 
been trying to get the Marcoussis Peace Accords back on track. Already the road map was lagging 
behind as disarmament of rebel groups was expected to be at an advanced stagein June 2005.68
 
Prior to 1994, South Africa’s involvement in conflict in Africa, particularly in Angola, Namibia and 
Somalia, was frowned upon by most African leaders since in most cases the government supported 
mercenary activities thereby, helping to protract such conflicts for economic benefits. The apartheid 
regime itself did not have any legitimacy as an independent peace broker. The democratic 
 
68 Integrated Regional Information Network, “Mbeki Reports on Peace Mission as Opposition Accuses Gbagbo of 
Preparing For War”, 11 Jan. 2005. Homepage of the Global Policy Forum. Accessed on 13 Jan. 2005. 
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transformation that took place in the country in 1994 as well as President Mandela’s activities and in 
recent years President Mbeki’s in strengthening regional and continental ties have given the country 
leverage over other states in Africa. 
 
 These have been bolstered by the success of South Africa’s peace initiatives in the Great Lakes and 
the fact that Thabo Mbeki is one of the founding fathers of the NEPAD and has made his vision of 
African Renaissance public. As a consequence, it came as no surprise that the AU mandated South 
Africa to bring the Ivorian peace process back on track when the French brokered Linas Marcoussis 
Accords were trampled upon after president Gbagbo attacked rebel positions in the North of the 
country in November 2004. The leading role taken by South Africa in trying to resolve the conflict in 
that West African country goes a long way to indicate that South Africa is committed to peace 
diplomacy in the continent. 
 
1. AU and ECOWAS’s search for a credible and neutral mediator 
 South Africa was chosen by the AU and the ECOWAS to mediate a peace process in Cote d’Ivoire 
because South Africa after all chairs the Peace and Security Council of the AU. Besides, there is 
reason to believe that the involvement of a credible third party outside West Africa might actually be 
the key to unlock the problem in that country69. Politics of hegemony is also important in this area as it 
helps in analyzing the subtle tensions among France, Nigeria and South Africa in the Cote d’Ivoire 
peace process. Indeed, these three countries have all been involved in trying to solve the conflict 
amongst the different factions in Cote d’Ivoire. 
 
1.1  A non-African mediator: France 
Contrary to the strong ties between France and Cote d’Ivoire in the days of Houphouet Boingy, the 
languid approach incarnated successively by Bedie, Guei and Gbagbo reflects the progressive 
disengagement of France and French interest in Cote d’Ivoire. Relations with France, the country’s 
 
69 Abdul Lamin and David Monyae, «Mbeki’s crucial intervention», Africa Week, 2004. 
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major trading partner and provider of bilateral assistance, have been close since independence. French 
reaction to Gbagbo’s elections as president in 2000 was divided along the party lines. President 
Jacques Chirac demanded that the election be rerun, incorporating those candidates who had been 
excluded from participating, while the French Parti Socialiste generally welcomed the accession to 
power of Gbagbo and the FPI. Following meetings between Gbagbo and Chirac in January 2001, 
France announced that full cooperation with Cote d’Ivoire, which had been suspended following the 
December 1999 coup, be restored.70 The French position after this period in the crisis has been 
doubted. Therefore, France’s similar unwillingness to use much force, as understandable as it is, has 
accomplished a similar result, that is, the partitioning of the country between the government and the 
rebels. To intervene and fight on the side of the government would create an inevitable quagmire for 
France, and the resultant body count would be politically suicidal for any Western government to 
accept. Nevertheless even that position of neutrality soon became problematic, as France was 
perceived as an enemy by both sides. On the one hand the government, which was goaded by France 
into a hasty compromise with the rebels, failed to see France’s position as helpful. The rebels, on the 
other hand, could not be persuaded by France as an honest broker, since it was the French troops that 
partly frustrated their desire to take over the capital and remove the government back in 2002.71
 
From late 2000, France dispatched additional troops to supplement the 550 personnel, which were 
already stationed in the country, and it is obvious that the French government played an active role in 
diplomatic efforts that led to the signing of the Linas Marcoussis Accords in January 2003. However, 
France stated that it regarded the civil conflict as the internal Ivorian matter, disregarding Gbagbo’s 
statement relating to the alleged involvement of external forces in the rebellion. Such involvement 
would have resulted in the invocation of a clause in a defence treaty between the two countries 
 
70 “France’s influence wanes in Cote d’Ivoire”, 4 Feb. 2003. Homepage of the Washington Post. Accessed on 10 Sep. 
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necessitating the active military support of France for the Ivorian authorities.72 To fuel distrust 
between France and Gbagbo, there was widespread anti-French feeling particularly in Abidjan 
following the conclusion of the Marcoussis Accords, and several thousand French citizens resident in 
the Cote d’Ivoire left the country. Supporters of Gbagbo felt that the Accords brought the rebels on an 
equal footing with the government and, according to some nationalists in Cote d’Ivoire this revealed 
the hegemonic influence that France still had over the country73. 
 
It has been argued that the French government wanted to get rid of Gbagbo because he is a new type of 
African leader, not prepared to bow down to their interests and privileges in the country. France and 
Burkina Faso have been accused of showing hegemonic attitude seeking to control Cote d’Ivoire’s 
wealth and potentials. Although this view is said to be demagogic, it nevertheless demonstrates the 
extent to which the conflict is perceived as a struggle for independence. Hence, France would no doubt 
like to see the major concessions continue in French hands, and are clearly worried about Gbagbo’s 
independence.74 With France removed from the possible list of peace-brokers in Cote d’Ivoire, only 
Nigeria and South Africa remained. 
 
1.2 An African mediator: Nigeria 
Another country with interests in the Ivorian peace process is Nigeria. Yet, Nigeria cannot be seen as 
an honest peace broker in Cote d’Ivoire because of many factors including the fact that Nigeria has 
always wanted to dominate the West African region. Indeed, Nigeria has been considered a bully 
hegemony by ECOWAS Member States. According to Adekeye Adebajo, Nigeria has been viewed as 
a “bull in a china shop” because there is a widespread claim in the region that Nigeria’s interventions 
 
72 Africa Focus Bulletin, “Cote d’Ivoire, Containing the Crisis? African Focus”, 16 Nov. 2004. Homepage of Africa Focus. 
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in Sierra Leone was undertaken in a bid to dominate its subregion.75 Moreover, these claims 
culminated as a result of the fact that Nigeria failed to obtain a mandate from ECOWAS and the UN to 
intervene in Liberia and Sierra Leone.76
 
Historic rivalry between France and Nigeria explains why these two countries could not be considered 
as honest peace brokers in Cote d’Ivoire. Different approaches for sub regional integration in West 
Africa have been going on through complex and unresolved attempts since the 1960s. France’s 
involvement in Cote d’Ivoire is a consequence of its traditional friendship with West African 
Francophone countries. As an ex-colonial power, France saw itself as bringing political, security and 
economic stability and cooperation to its former colonies. Thus, the shadow of France has loomed 
large in the region, through the relationship maintained with its former colonies. The “Cooperation 
Agreement” found expression not only in the conventional sense of development cooperation, but also 
included defence agreements by which the African states that are signatories could call upon France 
for direct security assistance and military material for their armies. Since British presence, though not 
insignificant in the economic domain in its former colonies was nevertheless less obtrusive and 
practically uncoordinated, the French shadow has proved very decisive in the pos-tcolonial pattern of 
cooperation in West Africa.77
 
On the other hand, Nigeria as former British colony, believes that West African countries should solve 
their own problems without the interference of their former colonizers. The attitude of ‘African 
solutions for African problems’ is embedded in the idea that former colonial powers are bent on 
creating division among Africans. Therefore, one believes that the division in West Africa between 
Anglophones and Francophones underlines the argument as who has merits of brokering a peace deal 
in Cote d’Ivoire. For example, one striking feature of all the attempts at regional integration was the 
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perpetuation of the divide between Francophone and Anglophone West Africa. This divide remained 
virtually intact and preserved the colonial legacy. Thus in spite of having achieved independence, 
West African states, particularly those which had been colonized by France, continued to depend on 
their former colonial rulers for trade, investment, aid and security. The few attempts to break this neo-
colonial dependence occurred at the bilateral and trilateral levels involving the important experiments 
by Nigeria, Niger, Ghana, Guinea, Mali and Senegal, Gambia (SeneGambian Conference)78
 
2  The United Nations and South Africa 
The politics of identity and constitutional legality that have sparked off the Ivorian crisis and led to the 
bloody civil war in 2002, have cemented the growing international debate on how and when to make 
the UN peacekeeping missions more relevant to African conflicts in the 21st century. Hence, 
implications of a third party intervention need to be scrutinized to ensure that it happens within legal 
framework of the UN. This is the reason why South Africa was requested to broker a peace deal in 
Cote d’Ivoire. In fact, South Africa has always worked together with the UN in peacekeeping missions 
in Africa. Chris Landsberg argues that the Mandela government focused on brokering peace pacts 
amongst belligerents in conflict situations. Mbeki too promoted this approach, but also showed a 
willingness to underwrite peace deal with UN peacekeeping operations.79
 
However, early in the post-war era only the UN was in a legitimate position to intervene in the 
domestic jurisdiction of a state to facilitate deal with internal matters with wider regional and 
international implications. Yet, the idea that only the UN can intervene to solve domestic problems of 
a particular state has come under serious attack. Today, it has been noted that AU has been mandated 
by the UN to initiate a conflict management effort in addressing and preventing a further escalation of  
conflicts between ethnic groups. Hence, the AU constitutive Act states clearly that « the AU shall have 
 
78 Senegal and Gambia for example reached an Agreement in November 1981, and pledged to integrate their military and 
security force and form an economic union. 
79 Chris Landsberg, The Quiet Diplomacy of Liberation: International Politics and South Africa’s Transition, 
Johannesburg: Jacana media, 2004. p.162-163 
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the right to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave 
circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity ».80 According to 
Rugumanu, the ability of repressive governments to strip citizens of their rights to security of life, 
often shrouded under a thin veneer of non-interference in internal affairs of the state, is increasingly 
challenged on a global scale. In fact the norm of sovereignty has been redefined and broadened, in 
order to respond to the new emerging principles of good governance: The traditional norms of 
sovereignty, consent and non-interference in internal affairs are no longer defined in absolute terms.81
 
Intrastate conflicts have presented opportunities to revisit the traditional moral values placed on state 
sovereignty and to expand the concept of intervention. For example, Zounmenou argues that moral and 
political dilemmas arising from the nature of the state in post-cold war conflicts were not anticipated 
by the UN’s founding fathers and within the UN security system, and this has presented profound 
moral and political challenges.82  
 
This simply means that the UN provided unsatisfactory political conditions and situations to 
legitimately intervene in order to manage intrastate conflicts between ethnic groups. The aim of the 
UN was to prevent further escalation of conflict between states. In short, the UN charter did not 
provide the legal framework for intervention to end intrastate conflicts that are today perceived as a 
threat to international peace and security. Zounmenou suggests that the UN was established to prevent 
wars between states, and is rooted in the Westphalian notion of sovereign equality, territorial integrity, 
and non-interference.83 Furthermore, Rugumanu argues that the Article 2 (7) of the UN Charter and 
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the Article 3 (2) of the OAU Charter stipulate that they will not intervene in matters that are essentially 
within the domestic jurisdiction of any state.84
 
Given the failure and limitations of the UN to prevent deadly conflicts in Africa, sub-regional role 
players in Africa are compelled to play a constructive role in security and peacekeeping. This is, of 
course, of special significance for South Africa as a subregional power or hegemony85. Therefore, the 
economic, human resource and the international reputation of South Africa’s role in conflict 
management, place the country in a better position to broker a peace deal in Cote d’Ivoire. Hence, both 
the AU and the UN could not ignore South Africa’s ability and capacity to bring peace in Cote 
d’Ivoire. 
 
Today there is an existing cooperation between the AU and the UN that enables sub-region organs to 
intervene and effectively manage conflicts in a broader manner. This provides a synergy between the 
AU and UN. In West Africa, Cote d’Ivoire in mind, ECOWAS is well placed to enhance conflict 
management. Thus, ECOWAS is designated with the right to intervene in a Member State to prevent a 
further escalation of conflicts. This is because ECOWAS is not far from the place where conflict is 
taking place. It is important to mention that this humanitarian intervention should happen within the 
context and framework of AU the and UN charters. 86. Given cooperation between the AU, ECOWAS 
and the UN, South Africa was mandated to help settle a peace deal in Cote d’Ivoire. 
 
Regional intervention in Africa has been both justified and highly criticized. Indeed, Africa has 
superficial and complex boundaries since countries are close to each other. Thus, in case of intrastate 
conflicts, regional organizations have agreed to intervene on behalf of human rights not only to 
stabilize the member states but also to save lives of civilians. Hence, sometimes political and 
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humanitarian intervention do not need a UN mandate before they take place. Consequently, regional 
intervention can help to minimize the human suffering.  
 
Nevertheless, one could argue that any regional, political and military intervention to save human lives 
and bring temporary stabilization in the member states should be seen as promoting the aims and 
objectives of the UN peacekeeping missions. In Africa, repressive governments have trampled upon 
human rights, leading their countries into states of anarchy. Thus, once a conflict spills over into 
neighbouring countries (West Africa), subregional blocks (ECOWAS) are justified to intervene where 
there is a perceived gross violation of human rights. Therefore, if subregional humanitarian 
intervention takes place, AU and UN missions can follow and make their way to enforce stability and 
bring peace. The UN mandate should always be respected but often UN is geographically limited. 
 
Given these reasons behind the designation of South Africa to bring a political solution to the conflict 
in Cote d’Ivoire, it is also vital to examine reasons why South Africa accepted to broker a peace deal 
in Cote d’Ivoire in November 2004 rather than two years earlier when the conflict was in its early 
stages. In fact, this is not the first time South Africa was requested to help solve conflicts in West 
Africa. Intrestingly, at first, South Africa refused to offer mediation in West Africa citing reasons that 
her resources were overstretched in other peacekeeping missions in Africa. For example, South Africa 
had deployed twice as many troops in the continent than was orginally envisaged. It became clear that 
these troops were already overstretched, forcing Pretoria in July 2003 to decline a request from West 
African leaders and ECOWAS for 1000 soldiers for peacekeeping duties in Liberia.87 Hence, the 
logical step is to ascertain reasons why this time around South Africa accepted to mediate a peace deal 
in Cote d’Ivoire in the backyard of West Africa. What are South Africa’s national interests in Cote 
d’Ivoire? 
 
87 Chris Landsberg, The Quiet Diplomacy of Liberation: International Politics and South Africa’s Transition, 
Johannesburg: Jacana Media, 2004. p.168 
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Chapter 6: South Africa and the Ivorian conflict: interests and constraints 
 
1.  South Africa’s national interests 
The end of apartheid posed some serious policy challenges to the foreign policy-makers of the newly 
elected and democratic ANC led government in 1994. The politics of reconciliation as espoused by 
Nelson Mandela in the domestic affairs were soon transported to the rest of the continent since South 
Africa through its racial and draconian policies was insulated from the international community and, 
more importantly, from its neighbouring countries. Prior to 1994, there was a deep-seated resentment 
between the apartheid government and the excluded black majority. This caused serious animosity 
between a white-ruled minority government and a black dominated majority. As expected, the 
National Party extended its policies of hostility to the sub-region and Africa as a whole. As a result of 
the destabilization policies pursued by the racist regime, South Africa became a pariah state in the 
international society. 
 
1.1  Improving South Africa’s profile 
The demise of apartheid precipitated a shift in the foreign policy of Mandela’s government through 
which South Africa pursued a strategy of reconciliation to engage the entire world. South Africa 
needed to move away from the isolationist position towards the development a strategy of constructive 
engagement which became a norm to deal with the rest of the international community. As Neta 
Crawford pointed out, South Africa’s new democratic government has articulated a dramatically 
different foreign policy vision than the previous National Party government by emphasizing support 
for human rights, internationalism and a commitment to promoting regional growth88. 
 
 
88 Neta C Crawford, “South Africa’s new foreign and military policy: opportunities and constraints”, Africa Today, 1st and 
2nd Quarters, 1995. p.88 
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The new foreign policy outlook and the regional recognition of its partners compelled South Africa to 
foster a policy of good friendly relations with the continent. Pretoria was aware that its success to 
achieve a stable region and economic development would inextricably depend on bridging the gap that 
was created by the then apartheid regime through its policies of regional destabilization. According to 
Deon Geldnhuys, previously white-ruled South Africa had the image of being a dangerous state89. 
Hence, the Mandela administration needed desparately to shift from this negative image. Therefore 
South Africa became a democracy through its first universal franchise elections held in April 1994. 
The new government quickly moved to inculcate a key objective: to break with a past which saw the 
country relegated to the status of the world’s foremost pariah state. The government wished to 
inculcate an image of the newly liberated Republic as a good and progressive world citizen90. 
 
Against this backdrop, Nelson Mandela’s foreign policy think-tanks had to craft politics of 
reconciliation not only to reconcile a divided South Africa but also South Africa with the international 
society. As argued by many, foreign policy is an extension of domestic policy. In fact, Kuseni Dlamini 
mentions that foreign policy is, in the final analysis, an articulation of domestic policy. The end of 
apartheid and the reconciliation efforts that followed gave South Africa a certain degree of moral 
stature in international affairs91. Consequently, Mandela’s foreign policy had to draw the human rights 
card as the guiding principle to interact with other countries, particularly neighbouring countries. 
Mandela claimed: 
Because I am an African, the emphasis of South African relations should be on promoting peace and the 
elimination of poverty. In forging links with our neighbours, the ANC will draw on an African tradition, of 
which we are part, of promoting greater continental unity.92
 
 
 
89 Deon Geldenhuys, “International involvement in South Africa’s political transformation”, in Walter Carlsnaes and Marie 
Muller, Change and South African External Relations, South Africa: International Thomson, 1997. p.36 
90 Chris Landsberg, The Quiet Diplomacy of Liberation: International Politics and South Africa’s Transition, 
Johannesburg: Jacana Media, 2004. p.159 
91 Kuseni Dlamini, “South Africa’s foreign policy since 1994”, in South African Yearbook of International Affairs 
2003/2004, Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs,  2004. p.2 
92 Neta C Crawford, “South Africa’s new foreign and military policy: opportunities and constraints”, Africa Today, 1st and 
2nd Quarters, 1995. p.97 
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With the new outlook, South Africa was obliged to find compelling ways to win the trust of its 
neighbours and in the process dismiss fears it would continue to “manhandle” its neighbours. Indeed, 
while South Africa has often been at pains not to be seen as the “bully” in political, diplomatic and 
military terms, it was nonetheless seen as the economic “bully” in the region. Yet, both Mandela’s and 
Mbeki’s governments rejected hegemonic ambitions in Africa. They adopted a strategy emphasizing 
that South Africa was a genuine regional partner in Africa, and that it would work closely with fellow 
African states to achieve common solutions to Africa’s common problems.93
 
The new generation of African leaders continued with the baton of Pan Africanism as articulated by 
Nelson Mandela and transformed it into a serious and formidable initiative-this Pan Africanism then 
evolved into what Mbeki called African Renaissance. The Mandela foreign policy first echoed its 
sentiments in the summit of the Organization of African Unity in 1994, when Mandela spoke of the 
Rwandan genocide: “we know it is as a matter of fact that we have it in ourselves as Africans to 
change all this. We must, in action, assert our will to do so”. Deputy President Thabo Mbeki, 
Mandela’s apparent heir, mentioned that this (South African) government sees itself as committed to 
peacekeeping for the African continent. Furthermore, Lamin succinctly explains that the progress 
toward peace in the Great Lakes region, and more specifically Burundi and the Democratic Republic 
of Congo, has been largely due to South Africa’s commitment towards espousing the vision of African 
renaissance with which Thabo Mbeki has been famously associated.94
 
1.2  Restoring peace and stability in Africa 
Politically, for South Africa, Cote d’Ivoire is very important since the situation provides South Africa 
with an opportunity to flex its diplomatic muscles on the continent. In addition to the South African 
desired objective of achieving peace, one of the outcomes of this process may ultimately lead South 
 
93 Chris Landsberg, The Quiet Diplomacy of Liberation: International Politics and South Africa’s Transition, 
Johannesburg: Jacana Media, 2004. p.186 
94 Abdul Rahman Lamin, Conflict in Cote d’Ivoire: South Africa’s Diplomacy and Prospects for Peace, Johannesburg: 
Institute for Global Dialogue, 2005. p.21 
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Africa to be seen by the international community as one of the African countries credible enough to 
secure a seat in the United Nation Security Council. Therefore, its intervention appears to be a 
calculated political decision as this gives South Africa a good standing as an honest peace broker on 
the continent. If South Africa succeeds in West Africa as it has done in other regions of the continent, 
this will send a strong signal to North Africa that South Africa can be called upon to mediate conflict 
in that region whenever needed. This will cement South Africa’s image and reputation as aspiring 
hegemony in the continent. For example, no matter how well intentioned they maybe, external 
interventions always face certain difficulties. Such interventions are not always seen as led by pure 
motives, even when conducted by respected international bodies or personalities. Participating states 
always have their national objectives for what they do95. 
 
1.3  Enhancing South Africa’s business market on the continent 
Economically, Lamin locates this analysis within the context of Cote d Ivoire and raised the question 
of what prompted South Africa to enter the Ivorian crisis as a mediator. In fact, he aptly argues that 
South Africa’s foreign policy decisions are driven by considerations of national interest. With respect 
to Cote d’Ivoire, South African business, in particular, stands to benefit economically if it succeeds in 
bringing peace to that country. As a former oasis of economic development in West Africa, Cote 
d’Ivoire would require massive amounts of foreign investment once it solves its political problems. 
Given the withdrawal of French business from the country in the wake of the escalation of the conflict, 
there is a potential void that could be filled by businesses from South Africa, many of which are 
paradoxically beneficiaries of a free and democratic country, with apartheid era restrictions now 
removed from their activities in the continent. In the long term, therefore, Cote d’Ivoire offers an 
opportunity for South African business that have in the last decade increasingly taken advantage of 
 
95 Alade W Fawole, “Ecowas and the crisis in Cote d’Ivoire: the politics and problems of peace-making in West Africa”, 
Journal of West African Affairs, 4(2), 2004.p23 
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their country’s proactive diplomatic posture on the Africa96. In fact, Cote d’Ivoire is South Africa’s 
biggest trading partner in Francophone West Africa. 
 
1.4  Facilitating the vision of African Standby Force 
 South Africa has in the past provided a platform  moving beyond the development of norms and 
principles that have preoccupied the AU in the few years, building the institutions necessary to 
promote peace and security on the continent is now South Africa’s priority. The African Standby 
Force is one of those institutions. South Africa’s involvement in Cote d’Ivoire provides a space to 
further make the case for the implementation of the standby force concept. It is plausible that in the 
near future France might withdraw its troops from Cote d’Ivoire thereby creating a vacuum. If and 
when this happens, the AU will be commissioned to provide manpower. Thus, South Africa’s 
involvement in Cote d’Ivoire is somehow seen by some countries as creating a space for it to exercise 
its hegemony ambitions in the continent. This has made Western sceptics such as the French president 
Jacques Chirac to argue that Mbeki would not succeed where the French failed.97
 
1.5  Strategic South Africa’s international interests in the United Nations 
As for South Africa, the role as a peace broker in Cote d’Ivoire provides an opportunity in a bid to 
secure a seat in the UN Security Council by showing the international community that its main rival 
Nigeria is not a suitable candidate. Nigeria has been perceived by some as a bully country with her 
own national interests and thus cannot be impartial in the process. This is well captured by Mortimer 
when he pointed out that classic peacekeeping theory assumes the neutrality of the interventionary 
force; it relies as well on the assumption that the local disputants are willing to cooperate with the 
 
96 Abdul Rahman Lamin, Conflict in Cote d’Ivoire: South Africa’s Diplomacy and Prospects for Peace, Johannesburg: 
Institute for Global Dialogue, 2005. p.23 
97 J. Seepe, “Ivory Coast leaders set eyes on peace”, City Press 10 Apr. 2005.p.19 
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peacekeepers or at least tolerate them as buffer. In Liberia, this precondition was never really met, 
because the shadow of hegemony (Nigeria) loomed over the ECOMOG from the outset. 98
 
In addition, South Africa’s involvement dispels the notion that no peace deal in the region can be 
achieved without Nigeria’s intervention. Now that South Africa has temporarily ended the conflict and 
if its succeeds, many West African countries will look up to South Africa in times of conflict because 
it will have been seen as an honest mediator. Indeed, Gbagbo has already mentioned that “We saw a 
lot of mediators and countries who wanted to solve our problems, but for the first time we saw one 
person who respected our positions. Mbeki respected the position of everyone and did not take 
sides”.99 Despite South Africa’s apparent success in temporarily ending the conflict in Cote d’Ivoire, 
there lie difficult and complex conditions constraining South Africa’s success to broker peace in the 
Ivorian crisis. 
 
2.  Conditions constraining South Africa’s role in Cote d’Ivoire 
South Africa’s efforts to bring peace in Cote d’Ivoire were constrained and compromised by many 
factors before it even entered peace talks in Cote d’Ivoire. Among others, are agreements as stipulated 
in the Linas-Marcoussis Accords, the lack of consultation of key regional players in the Ivorian 
Conflict and lastly, the perceived power struggle between Nigeria and South Africa? 
 
2.1  Linas Marcoussis Agreements 
The Linas Marcoussis agreement was designed by the French government in order to find a solution to 
the Ivorian conflict and lead  the Gbagbo led government and the rebels to accept a power-sharing 
deal. Indeed, the French government believed that the inclusive arrangement was the only solution to 
the Ivorian dispute. However, the Linas Marcoussis agreement was bound to fail as it had many gaps. 
Citizens loyal to Gbagbo complained that Linas Marcoussis was a French designed project to oust 
 
98 R. A Mortimer, “ECOMOG, Liberia, and regional security in West Africa”, in D. Rothchild and E.J. Keller (eds), Africa 
In The New International Order: Rethinking State Sovereingty and Regional Security, London: Lynne Rienner, 1996. p.161 
99 J. Seepe, “Ivory Coast leaders set eyes on peace”, City Press 10 Apr. 2005. p.19 
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Gbagbo as it was perceived to be more favourable to opposition groups. They argued that it compelled 
Gbagbo to make too many concessions that would be detrimental to his government. The fact that the 
agreement made provision for the allocation of ministerial positions, including the sensitive ministries 
of defence and internal affairs, to rebel forces was construed by Gbagbo’s followers as a conspiracy 
orchestrated by France100. Upon accepting the job as a mediator in Cote d’Ivoire, Thabo Mbeki 
announced that he would use the Linas Marcousis as a blueprint to solve the Ivorian crisis. Thus, 
Mbeki continued with the peace agreement that was built on a lack of faith and lack of trust between 
the parties. Hence, Mbeki supported a power-sharing deal that was bound to fail.  This is one of the 
major reasons why South Africa’s model of power-sharing in Cote d’Ivoire could not succeed. 
 
2.2  Key regional players in the Ivorian conflict 
South Africa’s peace diplomacy in Africa has always sought to include not only belligerent groups in 
the conflict but key regional players as well. This approach demonstrates that South Africa’s peace 
efforts are linked to regional security and that it favours a multilateral approach. Regional support is 
clearly needed in order to broker a durable peace deal in Cote d’Ivoire. For instance, in its attempt to 
achieve a peace deal in the Congolese conflict, the Mandela administration adopted an ostensibly 
evenhanded approach. Instead of principally engaging the rebels and their external backers, Uganda 
and Rwanda, it reached out to one of the DRC alliance members, former President of Namibia Sam 
Nujoma, and impressed upon him the need for a speedy solution to the conflict.101 Therefore, taking 
into consideration the role of neighbouring countries in the region and their intrests in the conflict, 
Mandela’s government realised and recognised that a long lasting peace solution lies in working 
together with key regional partners. Thus, South Africa managed to temporarily broker a peace 
settlement and exported its power-sharing model in DRC. 
 
 
100 Abdul Rahman Lamin, Conflict in Cote d’Ivoire: South Africa’s Diplomacy and Prospects for Peace, Johannesburg: 
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Having realised that regional actors could be in fact holding the keys to unlock a conflict, Thabo 
Mbeki too adopted the precedent set by Nelson Mandela. Taking over from Mandela the reign of 
settling disputes in the Great Lakes, Chris Landsberg argues that: 
 Mbeki spent most of the first quarter of 2003 engaging the heads of states of DRC, Rwanda, Uganda and 
Tanzania to try resolve the escalating conflict in DRC. Zuma later confirmed that Mbeki had succeeded in 
pressuring Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni to withdraw completely his troops from the DRC, and replace 
them with troops from the UN Mission in Congo. Aware of Tanzania’s disquiet about its low profile role in the 
Great lakes, Mbeki had requested Tanzanian President Benjamin Mkapa to become more involved in brokering 
and maintaining peace in Central Africa. Pretoria could achieve these breakthroughs by winning over the trust 
of sceptics.102
 
Strangely, in trying to solve the crisis in Cote d’Ivoire, Mbeki took a different approach. He met in 
Pretoria in April 2005 with leaders of various factions of Cote d’Ivoire to further discuss the road map 
to peace and reconciliation in that country. He received Allasane Ouattara former Prime minister and 
leader of the RDR Party, Lambert Kouassi Konan, Vice president of the Ivorian Democratic party and 
the main rebel leader Gillaume Soro and Gbagbo.103 Yet, he never received nor consulted any 
representatives of the neighbouring countries of Cote d’Ivoire and this severely thwarted South 
Africa’s success in that country. In fact, the President of Burkina Faso Blaise Compaore has always 
complained and accused Gbagbo for mistreating the Burkinabe living in Cote d’Ivoire. This is because 
most people living in the north of Cote d’Ivoire were born out of parents who left Burkina Faso to 
Cote d’Ivoire in search for jobs during the Ivorian economic boom. On the other hand, Laurent 
Gbagbo has accused Burkina Faso, Mali and other neighbouring countries for prolonging the conflict 
in Cote d’Ivoire because they were economically benefiting from it. According to the BBC 
The crisis in Ivory Coast has meant a rapid diversion of trade to neighbouring countries like Ghana who are 
struggling to meet the increased demand. When the crisis in Ivory Coast broke in September 2002, Ghana’s 
main port at Tema port was inundated with diverted ships looking for somewhere to offload their wares. One 
year on, business in Tema port is still booming, and what’s more, the number of ships using Tema is 
continuing to rise. Tema is just one of several ports in the region to have benefited from Ivory Coast’s 
misfortune. Ports in Togo and Senegal are also recording increased economic activity.104
 
 
102 Ibid, p,168 
103 “Rebels to meet Mbeki again”, 17 Dec. 2004. Homepage of News24.com. Accessed on 11 Nov.2005. 
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Moreover, Laurent Gbagbo accused Burkina Faso of being puppets of the French government to 
recolonise Cote d’Ivoire, leading him and his supporters to consistently argue, throughout the conflict, 
that the rebellion in their country was sponsored by outside forces. In fact, in their opinion, this is 
essentially a « liberation war » with obvious implications that the struggle for decolonization is still 
being fought against France. Their contention is that France is using its « agents » in the subregion, 
notably Burkina Faso, which has a terrible history of supporting rebellions in the neighbourhood, to re-
colonise Cote d’Ivoire105. 
 
Accusations and counter-accusations have surfaced that ECOWAS is purely incapable of brokering a 
durable peace deal in Cote d’Ivoire. The Francophone and Anglophone divide in the region remains 
one of the stumbling blocks to unlock the Ivorian crisis. For instance, with Nigeria’s bully attitude, 
some of the remaining countries in ECOWAS are unlikely to play any prominent role either. Ghana 
shares a contiguous boundary with Cote d’Ivoire, and for the avoidance of the spectre of Anglophone 
hegemony they have had to tread cautiously. Liberia and Sierra Leone have their own internal political 
problems to cope with. Burkina Faso is vicariously implicated in Cote d’Ivoire and therefore an 
unlikely peacekeeper, while Senegal is battling with its own domestic problems in the Casamance 
region. The remaining, predominantly Francophone states are small, poor and too weak to offer much 
hope106. Therefore, it became clear why South Africa sought to ignore the rest of the regional players 
and took a unilateral approach. Notwithstanding its size and economic ability, South Africa needs to 
include other regional actors in the peace process, as it is now clear that Sierra Leone and Liberia have 
just found peace after long civil wars. It is therefore in the mediators interests and the international 
community to engage Liberia and Sierra Leone in the negotiations in an effort to craft a durable 
solution to the entire region of West Africa. 
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2.3  Perceived Power Struggle between South Africa and Nigeria for the soul of Africa. 
The South African independence from the apartheid regime was seen by the international community, 
and especially by African leaders, as an independance for Africa. However, for Nigeria, South Africa’s 
independence and its role in the African diplomacy were perceived as a threat to Nigerian influence in 
Africa. Given the political and economic dominance of these two countries in Africa, the relationship 
between South Africa and Nigeria was expected to be a powerful partnership to spread and promote 
democracy in the continent. On the contrary, Africa became a battleground of power struggle between 
the two giants. For example, the hope of cordial and collaborative relations between Nigeria and South 
Africa in the aftermath of apartheid was not immdediately realised. Instead, Nigeria’s relationship with 
South Africa again became frostly. A diplomatic row broke out between the two countries over 
continued military rule in Nigeria and the gross violation of human rights thereof. The execution of 
Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other Ogoni environmental activists by Nigeria’s military government in 
November 1995, irrespective of the plea for clemecy by South Africa, was the last straw that broke the 
camel’s back. South Africa led a concert of other countries to impose sanctions on Nigeria and to 
effect its diplomatic isolation. South Africa felt isolation was justified based on the premise that the 
execution of the ‘Ogoni nine’ without fair trial was a violation of human rights, an area where Nigeria 
was expected to comform to international standards. The Nigerian government interpreted South 
Africa’s action as a ‘gang up’ aimed at reducing Nigeria’s status in Africa. The stage was then set for a 
face-off between two African giants107. 
 
Politics of hegemony also has an adverse impact on South Africa’s attempt to broker a peace deal in 
Cote d’Ivoire. As both countries are contesting for a seat on the United Nations Security Council, the 
designation of South Africa by the AU to broker a peace settlement in Cote d’Ivoire meant South 
Africa could now go beyond the Southern region to solve conflicts in West Africa, the backyard of 
Nigeria. This would be construed by the international community that Nigeria is unable to provide 
 
107 Ibeanu Okechukwu and Orji Nkwachukwu, “Despotism, democracy and diplomacy: Nigeria-South Africa relations 
1993-1999”, Journal of West African Affairs, 4(2), 2004. p.51 
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solutions to troubled countries in its region and therefore cannot be seen as a suitable candidate for a 
seat at the  UN Security Council. This could tarnish Nigeria’s image in the eyes of the international 
community.  
 
Moreover, South Africa’s involvement also dispel the notion that no peace deal in the region can be 
achieved without Nigeria’s intervention. In fact, this is not the first time South Africa emerged as a 
suitable candidate for a job to broker peace in Africa at the expense of Nigeria. Chris Landsberg 
underlines that in April 1997, Mandela announced that Kabila and Mobutu had accepted South 
Africa’s mediation, ostensibly at the expense of a rival mediation bid from Nigeria.108  It is necessary 
to trace back events that have culminated in the competitive relationship between South Africa and 
Nigeria. Their diplomatic relations are characterised by the politics of image, their roles in African 
politics. Ibeanu and Nkwachukwu note that immediately after attaining independence in 1960, Nigeria 
assumed a frontline role in the struggle against apartheid in South Africa, leading to frostly relations 
between Nigeria and the apartheid regime. In the ealry 1990s, there were high expectations that the 
end of apartheid would usher in cordial and collaborative relations between Nigeria and South Africa. 
However, in the aftermath of apartheid, relations remained competitive and conflict-prone109. 
 
 Aware of South Africa’s interests in West Africa, President Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria in 
November 2005, called an ECOWAS meeting comprising of nine heads of states to revisit and 
evaluate South Africa’s performance as a peace broker in Cote d’Ivoire. As a result, after assessing 
South Africa’s role in the Ivorian crisis, it was announced that South Africa was no longer suitable for 
the job as a mediator citing reasons that Thabo Mbeki is biased in his mediation and that he does not 
understand the political dynamics of the region. This reinforced the prophecy made earlier by the 
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French president, Jacques Chirac, that South Africa would not succeed in brokering a peace deal in 
Cote d’Ivoire because Mbeki did not understand the pyschology of the Francophone. 
 
Essentially, many African scholars perceive South Africa as assuming the leadership role that was 
occupied by Nigeria in many years. This perception was interpreted by Nigeria as a direct competition 
to its influence in African politics. Furthermore, South Africa’s mediation in Cote d’Ivoire was seen as 
an encroachment upon Nigeria’s territory. In the past five years, has emerged a ‘division of labour’ 
among Africa’s two powerhouses, Nigeria and South Africa. This has become a defining feature of the 
move toward greater unity and cooperation in continental politics. Before Pretoria’s direct 
involvement in Cote d’Ivoire, it had been generally understood that West Africa remains Nigeria’s 
‘sphere of influence’ while Southern Africa remained South Africa’s. That leaders of both countries 
understood this dynamic and respected each other’s jurisdiction in dealing with problems in their 
respective subregions was the rule, until South Africa’s direct involvement in Cote d’Ivoire in 2004110. 
To summarize, South Africa’s inability to broker a peace deal at this stage emanated from South 
Africa crossing the lines of jurisdiction and was thus perceived by Nigeria as a threat to its ‘sphere of 
influence’. In fact, under the pretext of evaluating South Africa’s performance in the Ivorian conflict, 
Nigeria’s ultimate objective was to undermine South Africa’s peace efforts in the Ivorian crisis. 
Hence, the name of the new Ivorian prime minister was announced by the Nigerian foreign minister in 
his capacity as a Nigerian official. This demonstrated Nigeria still has immense influence in West 
Africa. 
 
The different strategies adopted by these two countries in conflict resolution also intensify a 
competition between these two powerful African countries. As for South Africa, quiet diplomacy and 
constructive engagement are the most favoured style of diplomacy to settle a dispute between 
belligerent groups, while, Nigeria has been know for a no-nonsense and aggressive style of diplomacy. 
 
110 Abdul Rahman Lamin, Conflict in Cote d’Ivoire: South Africa’s Diplomacy and Prospects for Peace, Johannesburg: 
Institute for Global Dialogue, 2005. p.21 
 59
                                                
According to the parties in Cote d’Ivoire during the talks, Obasanjo’s no-nonsense of diplomacy 
resolved the matter of the new prime minister111. However, Nigeria’s aggressive diplomacy is viewed 
by many in the West African region as a ‘bull in China Shop’ because there is widespread claim that 
Nigeria’s interventions are undertaken in a bid to dominate its subregion112. Nevertheless, Nigerian 
style managed to resuscitate hopes of bringing peace in that troubled country. 
 
The war of ideas and the contestation of African diplomacy between South Africa and Nigeria delays 
and retard the peace efforts and conflict resolution in Africa. There is no doubt therefore that cordial 
relations between South Africa and Nigeria will precipitate a solution rather than a competition to the 
Ivorian crisis. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
 
The conflict in Cote d’Ivoire is fuelled by several interconnected issues such as, amongst others, 
identity, citizenship, nationalism and religious belonging, as well as external actors. The struggle over 
limited and diminishing resources and political exclusion of certain sectors of society is at the heart of 
the conflict in Cote d’Ivoire. As a result, a search for a peaceful settlement began as a need for an 
inclusive government that contains the interests of belligerent groups. Consequently, Linas-
Marcoussis, Accra and Pretoria Accords were deemed to be designed to heal the deep-seated 
animosity and division of the country between south-held government and rebel-controlled north. 
 
Parties involved in the crisis agreed to respect their commitment to the Linas Marcoussis, Accra and 
Pretoria Accords and to respect their commitments to all resolutions of the UN on Cote d’Ivoire. They 
also expressed their determination regarding the need to organise presidential elections in October 
2005 and legislative elections that follow immediately thereafter.113
 
Irrespective of the efforts made by different personalities, AU, ECOWAS, UN or France, the peace 
process in Cote d’Ivoire has been hampered by many factors, including a noticeable lack of political 
will and lack of trust from all the Ivorian parties to implement and commit themselves to the 
agreements contained in all the peace accords. It is clear by now that there was very little, if any, 
success achieved in the disarmament process. All parties, without exception, did indeed fail to live up 
to their committment to disarm, and instead chose to accuse each other of bad faith.114
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Given the lack of political will to implement the disarmament process, one could argue that all the 
Ivorian parties must politically and economically be benefiting from the conflict. For instance, 
the politics of identity, exclusion and resource distribution that sparked off the crisis and led to the 
civil war in 2002, have cemented the growing political divide between populations that predated the 
war. Thus, two mutually exclusive antagonistic dynamics are present in Cote d’Ivoire. For faction 
groups, interests alternated around their ability to win political power while simultaneously exploiting 
natural resources to sustain their struggle. The stakes in such conflicts are equally high for the 
incumbent government. For the latter, the need to maintain political control of the state, its resources 
and sovereign prerogatives becomes the critical factor underlying its position as a coherent state115. In 
the North, the Forces Nouvelles have substituted themselves for a state, organizing a parallel army, 
administration, media network and an economic structure. The political impasse is exceptionally 
lucrative for almost everyone except ordinary citizens. Major government figures have been accused 
of using state funds especially from the interlinked institutions within the cocoa marketing system for 
personal enrichment, purchase of weapons and hiring of mercenaries. Members of the Forces Nouvells 
monopolize lucrative economic activity in the north, including trade in cotton and weapons. Thus, it 
might be in the interests of all to ensure that they sabotage efforts made by the international 
community to broker a peace settlement since the conflict in Cote d’Ivoire is used for personal gains. 
 
The peace processes were a product of compromise, thus containing elements displeasing to all the 
parties. But all peace Accords highlight the issue central to the conflict; eligibility for the Presidency, 
land ownership, identity, citizenship and status of foreign nationals. Thus, disagreement around 
nationality and citizenship culminated to the attempted coup d’etat which was widely condemned by 
both Western countries and the AU. In the aftermath of the coup, ECOWAS summoned an emergency 
meeting in the Ghanaian capital of Accra to look into the Ivorian debacle. The Accra meeting was 
dominated by accusations and counter-accusations as Laurent Gbagbo argue that his was the legitimate 
 
115 Kwesi Aning, Emma Birikorang and Eboe Hutchful, “The political economy of conflict in West Africa: A contibution 
to the debate”, May 2003. p.7.Homepage of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 
Accessed on 24 October 2005. <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/19/4/33904808.pdf> 
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government and that it could not be put on par with the rebels on the negotiating table. Gbagbo also 
insinuated that the rebels had to disarm before any pact could be signed. The Accra meeting of 29 
September 2002 also resolved to dispatch mediators to broker a peace and to send regional 
peacekeepers to act as a buffer force between government troops and the rebels. The Accra I 
conference achieved little as Gbagbo’s uncompromising stance attracted the wrath of the ECOWAS 
mediators who voiced their disapproval at the stance taken by his government. The president also 
made it known that legitimacy was on his side and that the Accra meeting had moved away from the 
tenets of the ECOWAS spirit.116
 
After carefully considering the precarious security situation in Cote d’Ivoire and considering that the 
situation was fast developing into a Sierra Leone or Liberia scenario, the French president, Jacques 
Chirac invited the belligerents of the Ivorian crisis to a round-table in Paris, France from 18-23 
January 2003. France’s stance in calling the meeting was also informed by the fact that the state of no 
war no peace and no government was drifting the country towards an eventual showdown between the 
north and the south with disastrous consequences. The Paris round-table was therefore an effort by the 
international community to find lasting solutions to the stalemate and assist Ivorian political parties in 
finding lasting solutions to their common problems. After an intense debate and presentations of 
parties present, the round-table agreed that a government of National Reconciliation be set up 
immediately to ensure a return to peace and stability. The government would prepare an electoral 
timetable with a view to holding credible and transparent elections. A consensus prime minister would 
be appointed and the government would reflect the representativeness of the participating parties. It 
was agreed upon that the government would have executive powers.117
 
 
116 “Cote d’Ivoire - prevent genocide international”, 14 Dec. 2002. Homepage of Prevent Genocide International. Accessed 
on 15 Dec. 2005. <http://www.preventgenocide.org/africa/cotedivoire/> 
117 “Peace agreements, digital collection: Cote d’Ivoire (English)”, 14 Feb 2004. Homepage of the United States Institute 
for Peace. Accessed on 12 Oct.2005. <http://www.usip.org/library/pa/cote_divoire/cote_divoire_01242003en.html> 
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Though Seydou Diarra was appointed as prime minister, he did not enjoy the respect of all the 
belligerents in the conflict. Because of shortcomings identified in the Linas-Marcoussis agreement, the 
president of Ghana, John Kufour, in his capacity as the seating president of ECOWAS, invited the 
parties who signed the Linas-Marcoussis agreement to a meeting in Accra on the 06 March 2003. In 
this meeting, the belligerents reaffirmed their commintments to the Linas-Marcoussis agreement that 
they considered as the proper framework for the attainment of sustainable peace in the country. The 
Accra meeting also resolved to form a National Security Council in the country, comprising 15 
members, with Laurent Gbagbo as head. The participants also agreed that the ministries of 
communication and interior would go to the rebels.118
 
The Accra meeting called on the Ivorian government to take immediate action in collaboration with 
France and ECOWAS troops to ensure the security and safeguard the participants of the Linas-
Marcoussis Agreement and rebels members of the reconciliation government. An analysis of the Accra 
II Agreement suggests that the belligerents currently could not arrive at a common consensus on who 
was the aggressor in the Ivorian crisis. In addition, Accra II failed to institute a concrete timetable for 
the disarmament of the rebels and their integration into the regular Ivorian army as the Linas-
Marcoussis Agreement had prescribed. Little can one argue that since the Accra II Agreement, the 
precarious security situation still persisted. Despite the enormous work done by the Linas-Marcoussis 
Agreement implementation committee, the work of Accra I and II Accords, the efforts of the UN, AU, 
and ECOWAS mediators, the political crisis in Cote d’Ivoire is far from over. The situation became 
worse in mid 2004 when ministers from Forces Nouvelles left the government. Gbagbo responded by 
sacking same ministers in May 2004.119
 
 
118 “Accra II Agreement – About Ivory Coast political crisis”, nd. Homepage of Business Africa. Accessed on 3 Dec. 2005. 
<http://www.businessafrica.net/africabiz/ezine/wa/accra_agreement.php> 
119 “Accra III Agreements – About Ivory Coast political crisis”, nd. Homepage of Business Africa. Accessed on 3 Dec. 
2005. <http://www.businessafrica.net/africabiz/ezine/wa/accraIII_agreement.php> 
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It was at this point that president Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, in his capacity as the chair of the AU 
Peace and Security Council cluster, and having been mandated by the AU as chief mediator in the 
Ivorian crisis, invited the Ivorian political leaders to a meeting in Pretoria. The Pretoria meeting that 
was held between April 2 and 6 2005 and which was attended by the famous four in the Ivorian crisis 
– Gbagbo, Ouattara, Bedie and Soro – led to an agreement on a timetable to disarm the rebels and the 
militias. The Pretoria Accord also agreed that the chief of staff of the Ivorian army and of the rebels 
were to meet immediately in Bouake in order to ensure the implementation of PNDDR agreed upon in 
Linas Marcoussis, Accra II & III and reiterated in Pretoria. The chiefs of staff did meet in Bouake on 
the April 14 2005 to begin the disarmament process. Seemingly, rebels accepted to return to the 
government of national unity. The electoral commission was amended to include at least two 
representatives nominated by each party signatory to the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement. The Pretoria 
Agreement also mandated the mediator to request the help of the UN in the organization of 
presidential elections in October 2005.120
 
The board of directors of the national broadcaster, the Radio Television Ivoirienne (RTI), was to be 
reconstituted by Guillaume Soro, the minister of communication, in consultation with the prime 
minister, and the programmes of the channel would reflect and cover the national territory. On the 
question of the famous article 35 of the constitution, it was agreed that the mediator should undertake 
some consultation with AU Chair Olusegun Obasanjo and the secretary General of the UN Koffi 
Annan, whose decision on the matter would be communicated to the Ivorian leader121 The Pretoria 
Agreement has been praised as significant and more inclusive as it allows everyone to take part in 
running of the country. The parties, who had previously signed two other peace deals, which they later 
broke as a result of lack of trust among themselves, promised to ensure that the Pretoria peace 
agreement succeed. The attainment of such milestone by Mbeki has overshadowed statements Chirac 
made over Radio France Internationale that “Mbeki should immerse himself in West Africa so as to 
 
120 Beauregard Tromp, “Ivory Coast peace agreement signed”, 7 Apr. 2005. Homepage of the Star. Accessed on 10 Oct. 
2005. <http://www.thestar.co.za/index.php?fSectionId=129&fArticleId=2473470> 
121 J. Seepe, “Ivory Coast leaders set eyes on peace”, City Press 10 Apr. 2005. 
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understand the mentality and souls of West Africans because in times of crisis, you have to really 
know people’s mentalities and what is in people’s souls”122. It was clear that Chirac’s statements 
meant Mbeki stood no chance of succeeding in the Ivorian conflict. Afro-pessimism has been the 
major stumbling block Africans have to overcome in order to bring peace in the continent. 
 
Nevertheless, one of the shortcomings of all the peace agreements signed by the Ivorian parties was 
the non-recourse to timeframes as has been the case with the already postponed October 2005 
presidential elections. The peace agreements failed to identify the aggressor in the Ivorian crisis, so the 
spirit of impunity was very prevalent. The civil society, women and youth groups were not represented 
in conflict resolutions. Therefore, the Ivorians did not own the peace process, thus, little commitment 
was shown. Without infringing on the prerogatives of the president, the new prime minister has been 
designated with executive powers to organize elections in 2006. 
 
The Linas- Marcoussis, Accra II & III, Pretoria I & II failed to disarm the rebels, a situation which the 
present government is finding very difficult to pursue. These agreements did not indicate how 
sanctions would be meted out to parties that do not respect agreements stipulated in the accords. To a 
large extent, all the accords have been described as another loud sounding empty piece of paper with 
no weigh apart from the ink in which it was written.123
 
Lessons, Challenges for mediators and prospects for peace-building 
One of the aspects constraining peace-brokers in Cote d’Ivoire is the need to include the civil society 
in peacemaking activities. The previous peace agreements all took place on government level and 
virtually excluded the crucial role that could be played by the civil society during the disarmament 
process. Adekeye Adebajo argues that “civil society actors in West Africa pressured autocratic 
military regimes to leave power in Benin, Niger, and Sierra leone in the 1990s. More open political 
 
122 Ibid 
123 Lansana Gberie, “The crisis in Ivory Coast”, 24 Jun. 2004. Homepage of  Znet Africa Watch. Accessed on 30 Sep. 
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systems have emerged in West Africa. Thus, ECOWAS has established one of the world’s first 
security mechanisms to manage regional conflicts. The fact that regional actors took the lead in efforts 
to manage conflicts in West Africa represents a significant trend in conflict management”.124 In this 
context, South Africa and other mediators should always strive to ensure that the civil society is 
represented in future peace settlement in Africa. The civil society as stakeholders in the search for 
peace should be given more space to proactively strengthen the quest for peace in Cote d’Ivoire. 
 
The inclusive peace settlement will ensure that even though some countries in West Africa seem to be 
preoccupied with their own domestic problems in West Africa. The conflict in Cote d’Ivoire is so 
intense that failure to find a durable peaceful solution will spill over to neighbouring countries. 
Importantly, the peace process should take place within the realm of a comprehensive peace agreement 
for the entire region. Also South Africa cannot alone provide any lasting solution to the Ivorian crisis 
if it does not involve other countries in the region that happen to have invested their own interests in 
Cote d’Ivoire. At the external level is the intrusion of other states and personalities that, perhaps, 
harbour vested interests in the conflict and whose activities are likely to be inimical to the peace 
process125. There is no doubt that the past is now and will continue to haunt West Africa. Significantly, 
the biggest challenge for South Africa is to work collectively with all countries in the region to 
communicate the message that peace in Cote d’Ivoire is for the benefit of ECOWAS. . On the other 
hand, mediators should bear im mind that some countries in the region have supported the forces 
Nouvelles. Thus, the exclusion of Burkina Faso in the peace process will hamper the efforts of the 
international community. This is because it is an open secret that Burkina Faso is the main supporter of 
the Forces Nouvelles.the President of Burkina Faso Blaise Compaore has repeatedly accused Laurent 
Gbagbo for badly treating Burkinabes living in Cote d’Ivoire. Therefore, an amicable and genuine 
solution should be found between these two leaders. 
 
124 Adekeye Adebajo and Ismail Rashid, West Africa’s Security Challenges: Building Peace in a Troubled Region, London: 
Lynne Rienner, 2004. p.2 
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Furthermore, with the election of October 2005 postponed to 2006. The new prime minister Charles 
Konan Banny is mandated by the United Nation Resolution 1633 to prepare the disarmament of the 
forces loyal to Gbagbo as well as rebels to effectively organize the upcoming presidential elections in 
2006. 
 
However, members of the FPI echoed sentiments that the UN Resolution 1633 is an attempt to topple 
the government of Laurent Gbagbo by calling for the end of his term of office. This resolution was 
interpreted by the pro-Gbagbo youth as an attempt by France under the auspices of UN to remove 
Gbagbo from office. Subsequently, pro-Gbagbo youth, led by Charles Ble Goude took to the streets to 
protest against the UN Resolution by storming UN offices, thus, threatening the already fragile peace 
process. 
 
Against this backdrop, the major challenge is to find ways and means of implementing the 
disarmament process of the pro-Gbagbo militia as well as that of the rebel forces. This will ensure that 
elections are held by October 2006. On the other hand, it is difficult to see how the imposition of 
sanctions against those perceived to be blocking the peace process will easily facilitate the 
disarmament process. Of major problem is the lack of political will from both Gbagbo’s government 
and rebel forces to commit themselves to the long lasting peace process. 
 
Finally, prospects for peace-building mechanism will have to bridge the gap that divides the country 
between north and south in order to achieve any possible peace settlement. Lacks of faith and trust 
have been an obstacle to conflict resolution in Cote d’Ivoire. Ultimately, the ball is in the hands of the 
Ivorian leaders to take advantage of the efforts made by the international community to implement all 
initiatives of peace settlement. The biggest obstacle is for each side to put aside its ambitious personal 
interests and work towards a marriage between various political parties.  
